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FPD: 0016/75
9 May 1975

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Approved For Release 1999/09/26 : CIA-RDP86T00608R000200110015-3

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Foreign Press Digest: -- 0016/75 -- 9 May 1975

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GEN KESSLER STRESSES IMPORTANCE OF MILITARY POWER

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Dec 74 pp 3-12

[Editorial by Col Gen H. Kessler, deputy minister of national defense and chief of the main staff of the National People's Army]

/Text/ In 1974 the GDR passed the threshold into the second quarter of its development. This anniversary was connected with an impressive balance of the development of socialism: "The working class under the leadership of our party and together with its allies has in a quarter of a century created and constantly improved the solid building of our socialist state of peace, humanity, and freedom."¹ In this process the party of the working class and the GDR government, in close alliance with the Soviet Union and the other states of the socialist community, have done everything necessary and possible in every development phase in order to strengthen socialism. "At no time was it possible to proceed on this road without mastering new problems and decisively thwarting the designs of the adversary. We have the full right to say: all plans, doctrines, and provocations against our GDR have been defeated. The German State of workers and peasants and the strategy and tactics of our party, based on Marxism-Leninism, have prevailed."²

The positive balance we were able to draw on occasion of the 25th anniversary of the GDR received an important contribution from the military policy of the SED and of the GDR government. This made it possible to master the historical task of safeguarding the workers, peasants, and working masses of the GDR freed from capitalist exploitation and social oppression, as well as their great achievements in socialist construction made in close alliance with the other socialist armies, against the dangers emanating from imperialism and especially from the FRG.

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As a result of 25 years of its development, the GDR proves itself as a socialist state, which is firmly incorporated into the community of the Warsaw Pact states and is reliably protected militarily. It was possible through the joint struggle for the all-round strengthening of the socialist community of states under the leadership of the Soviet Union to preserve on the European continent the longest period of peace in this century. The citizens of the GDR consider the military protection of their socialist fatherland as their genuine duty. They provide conscious support to the measures required by the military protection of socialism. This consciousness of the masses and their partisanship vis-a-vis socialism, in general, and, specifically, in matters of its military protection is unthinkable without a revolutionary military policy, which is understandable to the people.

Implementation of the Leading Role of the Marxist-Leninist Party in National Defense--an Important Leninist Principle

The revolutionary character of the military policy of the socialist state results mainly from the fact that it is determined by the Marxist-Leninist combat party of the working class. True to the principle that a revolution is worth its salt only if it knows how to defend itself, the problems of revolutionary military policy, the build-up and utilization principles of the armed organs of the GDR, and the build-up and further development of socialist national defense represent to the SED an indivisible component of the solution of the power problem by the working class and its allies, as well as of the development of the developed socialist society in the GDR. "In our opinion, the leading role of the SED, which guided the build-up and development of the NVA [National People's Army] from its inception, is decisive. The SED Central Committee formulated the main direction of the build-up and development of the NVA. It saw to it that our army was equipped and trained from the start in accordance with its place and tasks within the allied armed forces."³

The realization of the leading role of the party is the most important of the Leninist principles for the build-up of armed forces. Implementation of the leading role of the Marxist-Leninist party permits a class-based approach to solution of all problems of national defense, of the unity of army and people, of socialist patriotism and internationalism, of progressive integration of the socialist armies into the socialist defense alliance, of the high conscious discipline of soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers, and of the unified political and military leadership and constant readiness of the armed forces to repel any possible aggressor. The deep scientific insight into the developmental laws of the classes and the class struggle, the state and revolution, war, armed forces, and defense of the socialist fatherland enables the Marxist-Leninist party to find even under the most difficult conditions the appropriate structure and elastic forms

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in the event of an imperialist aggression. In conformity with the decisions and guidelines of the party, specifically with respect to consistent fulfillment of the main military task of the NVA established by the Eighth SED Party Congress, the GDR National Defense Council as central organ for direction and organization of national defense determines the necessary measures for the continued military strengthening of socialism.

Effectiveness of Socialism through Example and Increasing Influence

Just as the entire policy of the party of the working class and its strategy and tactics in the widest sense are founded on the scientific bases of Marxism-Leninism so is also its military policy. Entirely in the sense of Lenin, the SED bases the formulation of its military policy on the fact that socialism becomes effective by setting examples. "Force is effective against those who want to restore their rule. However, this exhausts the importance of force, and it then becomes a matter of influence and example."⁴ Ever since socialism has become a reality, legions of ideologues and apologists of imperialism have attacked this unshakable premise of Marxist-Leninist military policy. They have ascribed military aggressiveness to socialism and have tried to shift the responsibility for imperialist predatory wars to socialism. While they had to tone down their imputation of "socialism's military aggressiveness" in view of the long post-1945 period of peace in Europe, they nevertheless still babble today about a "potential" threat. They finally have tried with psychological manipulations--for example, with the thesis that the Bundeswehr does not need an image of the enemy--to impute aggressive intentions to the NVA, since the NVA does not permit a dulling of the image of the enemy.

All these ideological tricks, imputations, and psychological manipulations remained without success. The ideologues and apologists of imperialism must today more than ever take into account the effects of the example of socialism. Also, they cannot change anything in our Marxist-Leninist conviction of the revolutionary effect of socialism by strength of example. It has become an unshakable principle of the policy of every Marxist-Leninist party and it is reflected in all fundamental programmatic documents, which touch upon problems of peace and socialism. For example the program of the CPSU states: "The ideas of communism win the minds and hearts of the broad masses not by war with other countries but by the example of a more perfect organization of society, by the growth of production forces, and by the creation of everything that is needed by man in order to live in happiness and well-being."⁵

As is known, V. I. Lenin proceeded in his treatment of all problems of military policy, specifically as they concern the development of the military program of the proletarian revolution, from the perception that the law of profit--the making of surplus as the "absolute law of that society,"

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as Karl Marx called it in "Kapital"--is the decisive cause for the unity of aggressiveness, war policy, predatory war, and imperialism.

By contrast, the decisive cause of the unity of peace and socialism is to be found in social relations freed from the striving for profit--from capitalist exploitation--, in the power of workers and peasants, and in the safeguarding of a constantly better satisfaction of the growing needs of society.

The society of profit, on the one hand, and the society freed from imperialist exploitation and suppression, on the other hand, are today the fundamental forces, which decide today the problems of war or peace, cold war or peaceful coexistence, and the increasing danger of war or international detente. Our experience teaches us that the forces of peace and socialism are playing a constantly stronger and impressive role in this difficult class conflict and that the international power equation continues to change in their favor.

Changes in the Power Equation in Favor of Socialism and Peace

In the year of the Red October and thereafter, the revolutionary forces proved strong enough to bring forth the power of the Soviets and to make this historical revolution irreversible. At the same time, international class solidarity with the young Soviet state made its appearance as a new, important factor of the international power equation. It prevented the imperialist powers from using all their economic, political, and military potentials in the struggle for the intended destruction of Soviet power. It was, however, not possible to escape the devastations of the counter-revolution and imperialist intervention from the fatherland of all the working people.

Barely two decades afterwards, republican revolutionary forces were strong enough in order to establish a democratic republic in Spain and to defend it for almost 3 years in alliance with the members of the international brigades against the Franco brigands. However, they were unable to preserve the Spanish republic against the attack of the international counter-revolution and of the Franco fascists. In 1939 and in subsequent years, the Soviet Union and internationalist forces of the peoples fraternally allied to it were able to repulse strangulation by the strongest military machinery produced so far by an exploiter society. However, they were not yet able to develop the power necessary to allow the masses to escape the destruction of World War II.

As a result of the victory of the Soviet Union and the powers of the anti-Hitler coalition allied to it over German fascism and Japanese imperialism, the country of Lenin, the states of socialism fraternally allied to it, as well as the revolutionary movement in the capitalist countries and the

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national liberation movements developed to a greater extent the strength which prevents imperialism from instigating a new world conflagration. The old goal of the struggle of the revolutionary workers movements--prevention of imperialist wars--entered into the realm of possibility and reality.

This powerful unfolding of the forces of socialism and peace is based on the decisions of the International Consultation of the Communist and Workers Parties of 1969 and on the peace program of the 24th CPSU Party Congress.

High Defense Capability for the Protection of Socialism Serves Peaceful Coexistence

The strategic concept of the communist world movement, as it was confirmed by the International Consultation of 1969, contains a number of goals, which have fundamental importance for the revolutionary military policy of the states of the socialist community and its communist parties. The following goals deserve emphasis:

- continued comprehensive strengthening of world socialism as main bulwark of all anti-imperialist forces in the world;
- continued repression of the aggressive policies of imperialism;
- consolidation of world peace and implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations.

In the struggle for implementation of these goals there arose a political situation in Europe--a continent which is so important for the international class conflict--which is characterized by a turning away from the cold war to detente and which offers more favorable conditions for the struggle to consolidate peace and security of the peoples. Looking back to the maturing of this new situation of world historical importance, the General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, comrade Leonid Brezhnev, noted on 14 June 1974: "In assessing the general power equation in the world, we already arrived at the following conclusions several years ago: there exists a real possibility to bring about a fundamental turn in the international situation. It was a matter of discussing and solving matured problems comprehensively and constructively. This design, new policy of ours found a general expression in the peace program proclaimed by the 24th CPSU Party Congress...

The main cause is that we have succeeded in really consolidating the foundations of peace and security of the peoples and in reducing the danger of atomic war."⁶

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The turn from cold war to international detente is therefore neither an expression of a change of imperialism to reason and abandonment of its aggressive intentions nor a product of the policies of the anti-Soviet great power chauvinists, who are inimical to socialism. It is exclusively the result of the struggle of the three main revolutionary currents of our time and, mainly, of the socialist community of states as the main revolutionary force. A constantly more active and offensive role is being played in this process by the coordinated foreign policy of the socialist community, which is based not only on the growing economic and political power of those countries, but also on their increasing defense capabilities.

"Our party has always been guided by the awareness that there exists an indivisible unity of socialist construction, our peace policy, and the struggle for the military safeguarding of the socialist achievements of the working class and of all working people."⁷ The successes of our working people in socialist construction as well as the reliable safeguarding of socialist achievements are essential conditions for the further successful unfolding of the socialist peace offensive under the leadership of the Soviet Union.

Imperialism relinquishes positions--for example those of the cold war--only under the pressure of having to adapt itself to the changes in the international power relationship in favor of socialism. The growing defense capability of socialism/communism, which constantly and impressively demonstrates to imperialism the futility of any attempt of a military "roll-back," will remain a factor of decisive importance. The peace policy of the Soviet Union and of the other socialist countries has already yielded noticeable results. It is stable and will not be subjected to momentary changes in the future as well. The more securely socialism is protected in military respect against the aggressive desires of the imperialist powers, the fuller will be the scope of the socialist foreign policy and the greater will be the successes of the socialist community of states in the further implementation of the policy of peaceful coexistence in relations between states with opposing social orders. This close interrelationship also becomes evident in the goal of the socialist foreign policy to "create, in close alliance with the Soviet Union and the other states of the socialist community, the most favorable external conditions possible for the peaceful construction of socialism and communism and thus to secure peace for the present generation and future generations as the most valuable commodity of mankind."⁸

As was repeatedly stressed at the 24th CPSU Congress and the Eighth SED Congress, the continued strengthening of the defense capability of socialism/communism is and remains one of the most important foundations of the socialist peace offensive. "Everything which was created by the people must be reliably protected. To strengthen the Soviet state means

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also to strengthen its armed forces and to increase the defensive strength of our homeland comprehensively. This remains one of the most important tasks as long as we live in a troubled world!"⁹ Following the lead of this orientation of military policy formulated by the 24th CPSU Congress, the Eighth SED Congress proclaimed the following as the most essential task of our military policy: "We shall not give any chance to the enemy to attack socialism and to disturb our peaceful life. His plots will fail in the future because of the revolutionary vigilance, the defensive strength, and the defense readiness of the people of the GDR and its armed organs."¹⁰

Requirements of the Strengthening of National Defense

In order to meet this task in an ever better manner, the Party Congress fixed attention on two fundamental requirements which must be constantly met:

1. Planned perfecting of the GDR's national defense;
2. contribution to the strengthening of the defensive power of the socialist community of states, because "comradeship-in-arms with the Soviet army and the armed forces of the other states of the Warsaw Pact is a command of socialist internationalism and forms a firm foundation of our security."¹¹

The formulation of the main military task of the NVA as the main force and nucleus of our national defense occupies a special place in the statements of the Eighth Party Congress with regard to the military policy of our party. It consists of the "reliable protection of the state frontiers, the territory, the air space, and the outlying coastal areas of the GDR, as well as of the allied socialist states, jointly with the Soviet Army and the other fraternal armies of the Warsaw Pact."¹² In connection with this, the Eighth Party Congress stressed the necessity to further strengthen the combat strength and combat readiness of the NVA.

The efforts of all members of the NVA and the frontier troops of the GDR to strengthen the combat strength and a readiness of the socialist armed forces are an important contribution to the comprehensive strengthening of socialism. Because the soldiers, noncommissioned officers, officer candidates, officers, generals, and admirals, as well as the civilian employees of the NVA have managed in the 1973/74 training year to constantly better understand how to fulfill the tasks assigned to them with honor, they have implemented in practice the revolutionary military policy of the SED and the GDR government. They have proven themselves repeatedly and in a manifold manner as a reliable partner of the socialist defense coalition.

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Closer Comradeship-in-Arms with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany
(GSFG)

The commanders, political organs, and party organizations endeavored in thousands of joint training measures and performance comparisons to use the excellent performances of the Soviet comrades-in-arms still more consistently as a yardstick for education in their battalions, regiments, divisions, and staffs. It was thus possible for comrade Erich Honecker, first secretary of the SED Central Committee, to state during a visit to units of the Soviet Army in Magdeburn Bezirk on 13 September 1974: "We consider the unbreakable comradeship-in-arms among the socialist armies to be proletarian military internationalism in action, which manifests itself to us primarily in the relations with the comrades of the GSFG.

The cooperation of the staffs, regiments, and battalions of both armies has reached a qualitative new stage in the past few years. It has a steadily more direct effect on the growth of the combat strength and readiness of the NVA. Collaboration in the area of the daily duty list, joint training on the basis of coordinated plans and uniform norms, joint use of training bases, assistance for acquisition of mastery of modern armaments and technology, fruitful exchange of experience, and performance comparisons became as much a part of every-day military life as sporting events and games, joint cultural events, and cordial military friendships."¹³

With the results in the socialist competition "Military Assignment 25-- Resolved to Do Battle and Combat-Ready at Any Time Like Thaelmann!," the NVA and the frontier troops of the GDR confirmed again: The peoples of the socialist community of states and their armed forces have in the NVA and the frontier troops of the GDR reliable class comrades and allies. The "Military Assignment 25" was a further chapter of the revolutionary military policy of our socialist state in action.

Greater Demands on the NVA in the 1974/75 Training Year

It will be required in the 1974/75 training year to proceed with the increase of the battle strength and combat readiness of the NVA and the frontier troops of the GDR, the consolidation of military discipline and order, the ideological and political steeling of all army members, the strengthening of class relations and mutual trust among them, and the conveying of a realistic image of the enemy under conditions of the sharpening political and ideological struggle of imperialism against socialism.

These great tasks place high demands on the NVA and on the frontier troops of the GDR during the 1974/75 training year in order to further secure

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peace and socialism reliably and to make the continuation of the policy of peaceful coexistence among states with opposing social orders in Europe possible. The 20th anniversary of the socialist military alliance will be a high point of the training year starting now and will be celebrated in a dignified manner also in the GDR in accordance with the determinations of the Consultative Political Committee of the Warsaw Pact.

Twenty years of the Warsaw Pact mean two decades of reliable protection of socialism and peace in Europe. They attest to the long road of successful revolutionary military policy of the socialist states, the most visible result in recent years was the turn from cold war to the steadily wider implementation of peaceful coexistence among the states of socialism and capitalism in Europe, which was enforced by the vital power and continuous strengthening of socialism.

At the side of the fraternal powers, we want to prove with all our strength on occasion of this anniversary: the united armed forces of the member states of the Warsaw Pact dispose over high combat strength and readiness and are able to reliably protect the peaceful work of the fraternal peoples.

FOOTNOTES

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2. Ibid.
3. H. Hoffmann: "The Military Contribution of the GDR to the Protection of Socialism and the Safeguarding of Peace." In: DEUTSCHE AUSSENPOLITIK, Berlin, No 4, 1974, p 839.
4. V. I. Lenin: "WERKE" ("Works"), Vol 31, Berlin, 1972, p 452.
5. "Programm und Statut der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion" ("Program and Statute of the CPSU"), Berlin, 1961, p 124.
6. L. I. Brezhnev: "For Additional Successes in the Construction of Communism." In: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (B-edition), 15 Jun 74.
7. E. Honecker: "Die Rolle der Arbeiterklasse und ihrer Partei in der Sozialistischen Gesellschaft" ("The Role of the Working Class and Its Party in Socialist Society"), Berlin, 1974, p 28.
8. O. Fischer: "The Foreign Policy of the GDR--a Factor for Peace and Socialism." In: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (B-edition), 15 Sep 74.

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9. L. I. Brezhnev: "Rechenschaftsbericht des Zentralkomitees der KPdSU an DEN XXIV. Parteitag der Kommunistischen Partei der Sowjetunion" ("Accountability Report of the CPSU Central Committee to the 24th CPSU Party Congress"). Moscow/Berlin, 1971, p 110.
10. "Bericht des Zentralkomitees an den VIII. Parteitag der Sozialistischen Einheitspartei Deutschlands." Berichterstatter: Erich Honecker ("Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth SED Party Congress." Speaker: Erich Honecker), Berlin, 1971, pp 69 ff.
11. Ibid., p 68.
12. Ibid.
13. E. Honecker: "Progress and Flourishing--Results of the Fraternal Alliance." In: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (B-edition), 14 Sep 74.

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GOALS OF 1975 TRAINING YEAR OUTLINED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Dec 74 pp 13-17

[By Col Dr R. Richter]

/Text/ As is the case at the start of every training year, an atmosphere of great activity in the military collectives now prevails in order to tackle the increasingly difficult tasks of 1975. This becomes evident particularly in the numerous initiatives of the soldiers, noncommissioned officers, officer candidates, and officers in order to vigorously meet the commitments made in the new competition programs from the very first day. It is being confirmed again that socialist competition is an inseparable component of the political and military life in the NVA /National People's Army/ and the frontier troops of the GDR. The military everyday life can no longer be imagined without it: competition belongs to our socialist life style.

Combining Socialist Competition with Political Military Tasks

This mass movement of the soldiers for high performance in military service reflects the awareness of being a soldier in one's own behalf. The capacities of the personality as well as of the collective unfold most completely within competition. It has therefore proven itself to direct the attention of the commanders, political organs, and party and mass organizations at the very beginning of the new training year toward the mobilization of all efforts in socialist competition to fulfill combat programs of the collectives and individual commitments by setting goals, outlining methods for solution, and creating favorable conditions for the fulfillment of the commitments made.

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A good start determines largely how well our struggle for high combat strength and readiness will proceed during the entire training year and how the political and military tasks will be met which have been established by the Eighth SED Party Congress and the Ninth Delegates Conference of the SED Party Organizations in the NVA and the frontier troops of the GDR. The experience of the best performers is a valuable aid in meeting the great tasks. We therefore use it from the very start of the competition and make the performances of the best performers a standard for bringing all army members up to their performance level. We have a good starting position for those lofty goals.

In honor of the 25th anniversary of our republic, good actions were carried out by our army members and frontier soldiers. We consciously start from these actions, because they attest to high political awareness and exemplary fulfillment of military obligations. In continuation of good competition traditions, the most comprehensive mass movement to date took place in the anniversary year of the GDR in the NVA and the frontier troops of the GDR. Probably the most important precondition for this was the unlimited affirmation of all army members and civilian employees to their socialist state. The following applies also to the new competition: the alpha and omega of purposeful direction of competition consists in the persuasive political motivation of the high goals in the "Soldiers' Initiative 75" competition. What we are striving for are constant and lasting performances and achievements, which are the result of aware actions of the army members.

The socialist competition within the NVA and the frontier troops of the GDR must therefore contribute to deepen knowledge and understanding of the strengthening of the developed socialist society in the GDR and of the constantly firmer unity and cohesiveness of the socialist community of states and its armed forces. It is therefore correct when most of the units made commitments which are aimed at further developing the intellectual life of the collective and the class outlook of every individual; that is the case when the awareness-forming function of socialist competition is stressed more strongly in order to arouse and foster the initiative of our soldiers.

These activities are mainly directed toward:

- the study of selected works of the classical writers of Marxism-Leninism and improvement of political instruction,
- the conduct of a realistic and persuasive agitation,
- the activity in circles of young socialists and so forth.

Because: "Soldiers' Initiative 75" is for us an expression of our unshakable trust in our loyalty to the working class and its Marxist-Leninist party.

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"Soldiers' Initiative 75" is for us an expression of our determination to make an active contribution to the increase of the combat strength and combat readiness of the NVA in the interest of a complete strengthening of the GDR as a firm part of the socialist community of states.

"Soldiers Initiative 75" is for us an expression of our will to always honorably fulfill our internationalist class mission in close class and fraternal alliance with the Soviet soldiers and the members of all the other fraternal armies.

"Soldiers' Initiative 75" is for us a will and a commitment to give no chance to the enemy. This requires, however primarily high political awareness and a firm class outlook. These thought and behavior patterns will be rooted in the hearts and minds of our soldiers, if the following conviction is being deepened: to be a soldier means to assume an internationalist responsibility for the strengthening of socialism and its secure military protection.

The commanders should therefore consult jointly with the party- and FDJ /Free German Youth/ leaderships on how to improve the political discussions and how to organize political instruction in a more eventful manner, political meetings more adequately, and cultural leisure time activities more exactly. Our soldiers expect persuasive and realistic arguments, which answer their questions in an understandable manner.

Combat strength and readiness increase the fastest wherever the commanders and the military collectives combine socialist competition organically with the solution of all political and military tasks and, primarily, with combat training.

High Effectiveness of Combat Training--an Essential Component of Competition

This requires above all a thorough service preparation and constant struggle for good training results. The emphasis of instruction should be on avoiding any loss of time and on effective utilization of training bases, weapons, and technology.

Every soldier can make a contribution by learning to master weapons and military equipment in an accomplished manner and by caring for them and maintaining them, by ensuring the constant readiness of technological means, and by obtaining the marksmanship qualification and badge. Many opportunities for creative initiative arise specifically in the competition for the five military decorations.

All experience gained so far confirms over and over again that what is required is mainly a clarification of the following questions. What can

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we learn from our friends? Have we created all the conditions for good training? How can we discuss the tasks of combat training still more thoroughly? Is material maintenance always assured? Is every soldier included in the struggle for high performances? How can the experience of older comrades be used quickly and how can it be conveyed to the comrades in the first half year of service in the form of fraternal assistance?

These are questions which are primarily addressed to the commanders, because their entire concern must become evident from the first day of the new training year, as to how the manner in which conditions are now being created permit the soldiers to meet their commitments.

Has everybody done his best? Is mutual assistance being given? What innovator proposals can be submitted? These are questions which must be submitted to every squad and every platoon.

Discipline and Order--an Essential Factor of Combat Strength and Readiness

Discipline and order, socialist relations between superiors and subordinates and among all members of the collective are preconditions for raising the combat strength of the individual to a higher quality, leading to a higher collective combat strength as well. Therefore struggle for exemplary fulfillment of military duties plays an important role in competition. The struggle against all phenomena of behavior contrary to regulations and immoral, is therefore an important aspect of socialist competition. Any damage, a single contravention of leave regulations, or any other violation causes a setback in the combat readiness of the entire unit. Everybody should be accountable even in the smallest unit--squad, complement, or crew--in how he follows all orders unconditionally and how he lives according to service regulations. This should be thoroughly discussed in an open, honest, and friendly atmosphere, and the reasons for good as well as bad discipline and order should be investigated. The best performers also set the standards in this respect. The education of the collectives must be deepened so that the best performers will be emulated and the general performance level can be raised. Every army member must be sure that he meets his class responsibility every day by taking an active interest in a high level of political-ideological work, a well-prepared, strictly and effectively organized training, a strict military discipline, as well as a smooth execution of daily service duties. Fraternal relations between soldiers in the first half-year of training and the disciplined behavior of the army members play a special role in this.

Intellectual and Cultural Life and Mass Leisure Time Sports--Important Aspects of Competition

No struggle program is permitted to exist in which is not established how the intellectual and cultural life of the unit is going to be

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enriched by exacting events. Many collectives pay great attention to work with books, films, records and tapes, visits to theaters and concerts, as well as to artistic activities of the army members. This is good, because lasting and eventful cultural events have a refreshing influence on the daily service routine. Often, however, these intentions remain in the wishful thinking stage. The drop-out rate was still too high, while attendance remained too low at many of the events. Let us take advantage of social forces! There are many young army members who enthusiastically create songs within the song movement, who love to sing, and who are ready to expand their knowledge in many different areas by joining the respective clubs. They cooperate actively within club councils in order to convert record-meetings, book discussions, film presentations, discussions with labor veterans, soldiers' forums and so forth into meaningful experiences.

Let us pay more attention to commitments for shaping the intellectual and cultural life! The following experience has proven itself thousand-fold in the practice of military life: the intellectual and cultural life in the units is not an appendix of daily military life and competition to which subordinated importance can be attached. Things proceed well, as a rule, wherever there exists a combination of realistic combat training and active intellectual and cultural life.

We want to make sure, above all, that the political and cultural measures on occasion of the important anniversaries--30th anniversary of liberation and the 20th anniversary of the Warsaw Pact--that the "Week of Comradeship-in-Arms, and the "Weeks of Youth and Sportsmen" become events of highly informative and educational value.

It is necessary at the same time in the mass leisure time sports to conduct the competition for the "best performer" title of the ASV /General Sports Association/ "Vorwaerts" continuously. It is necessary in this respect to obtain a high rate of participation in the long distance competitions of the ASV, in the fulfillment of requirements for the sporting, swimming, and military badges, as well as in internal games and competitions.

Just as in training, there is ample room for initiative and opportunity to compare our strength with Soviet friends in the area of culture and sports.

This raises important questions of leadership. Experience has shown us over and over again that the competitions must be guided. It is a fact that every "generation of soldiers" wants to enrich the book of good deeds with its own handwriting, for its own advantage, in the interest of its families, and for the glory and strengthening of our republic and of the entire socialist community. It is known that mass initiative is not realized automatically. It requires purposeful leadership by the

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commanders. This is the essence of the dialectics of initiative and giving of commands, of coresponsibility of the military collective and leadership activity. The results of the competition "Soldiers' Initiative 75--Jointly with the Brothers-in-Arms--Strong for Battle and Ready for Combat" depend therefore to a high degree on whether organization of the competition is becoming more strongly a direct component of the daily leadership activity of all our commanders.

When cases still exist in which a relatively large number of commitments are not being met, then this is due in quite a number of cases to the indifference of commanders and also of party- and FDJ organizations vis-a-vis commitments made. The combat programs of the military collectives prepared in the last few weeks, and individual commitments indicate a further increase in the mass initiative. A constantly increasing number of soldiers, noncommissioned officers, officer candidates, and officers are making concrete, accountable pledges. Our entire attention must be devoted to this.

What is the Immediate Goal?

The goal is well determined. Under the motto "Soldiers' Initiative 75--Jointly with the Brothers-in-Arms--Strong for Battle and Ready for Combat" we are struggling in the 1974/75 training year for:

--still greater cohesion and constant combat readiness of the battalions and regiments;

--activation of political mass work, improvement of political instruction, acquisition of the experience of our Soviet comrades-in-arms;

--very good and good results in combat training and the solution of combat tasks;

--constant strengthening of military discipline and order, consistent fulfillment of service regulations, voluntary and conscious subordination to the laws of military life, which includes trusting and class-related relations not only between superiors and subordinates but also between peers and firmly unified battle collectives;

--further vitalization of the intellectual, cultural, and sports life in all service areas and units.

It is now necessary, above all, not to tolerate any loss of time and not to permit that the competition tasks are dragged out of us, so to speak. An important step has been taken with the preparation of the programs. But this is only a beginning. We must now see to it that our plans are implemented, not tomorrow, but today.

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We should handle everything just like the best performers do: each good and very good performance executed today becomes the starting point for more extensive initiatives. In doing so, we must be intolerant from the very start not only vis-a-vis routine and set patterns but also with respect to an unhealthy "chase after good grades" /Notenjagd/, that is, for grades which do not hold up under close scrutiny.

The majority of our army members have recognized that the competition is a matter, which must be dealt with seriously every day, and they act accordingly. They therefore give a public accounting of the results obtained and are struggling already today to meet the goals.

Many units organized an exchange of experience at the start of the new competition. This should be the case everywhere. This competition is for us also the most profitable source of new actions aimed at a further strengthening of the combat strength and readiness of our battalions, regiments, and divisions. With the new competition we shall make a personal contribution toward the fulfillment of the main task placed before us.

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SOCIALIST MILITARY POLICY SEEN SECURING PEACE

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Dec 74 pp 26-30

[By Col W. Effenberger, historian]

/Excerpt/ To fully comprehend the defense efforts we are making and what it means to be a soldier under socialism, it is more than ever necessary to understand the peace-securing mission of the socialist armies and of all areas of socialist national defense. In this we are proceeding from the dialectic that--as the Political Advisory Commission observed--on the one hand "the tendency toward detente has become the factor that ultimately determines the development of the situation on the European continent and in the entire world at present but, on the other hand, the enemies of international detente, the adherents to the cold war, the forces of imperialism and reaction have not given up and are trying to obstruct that process of detente however much it represents the hopes of the peoples." The conclusion drawn from this reads: "As long as the NATO bloc exists and has not implemented effective disarmament measures, the Warsaw Pact countries consider it necessary to strengthen their defense capability and to develop their close cooperation in that direction."¹

Understanding the inseparable connection between our struggle for peace and detente and the defense efforts socialism must make on its behalf furthers to a high degree an individual's allegiance to and actions for the protection of socialism. Socialist defense motivation--the safeguarding of peace--under our social conditions does not only, however, carry these overtones of being purposeful in a current sense, justifying military efforts under the prevailing conditions of the political easing

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of tension. Our socialist military policy aims at militarily securing the peace forever.

This ensures favorable external conditions for the building of socialism/communism in the countries of the socialist community of states as well as for the development of the anti-imperialist struggle in the other parts of the world. This is also in line with the main task of the NVA. It helps realize the historical mission of the socialist military coalition, prevents imperialism from unleashing wars, quells hotbeds of wars at their source and thus, preserves peace.

The socialist armies affiliated in a close comradeship-in-arms in the truest sense of the word are fulfilling a peace-securing mission. This mission by the socialist armed forces is something entirely new in the development of human society. Under the systems of exploitation the armies were exclusively instruments of predatory wars, aggressions against the outside and suppression of progressive forces within.

In socialist society, the army fulfills a deeply humanistic task. Under socialism it becomes, objectively, an instrument that prevents war, an important peace-preserving factor.² The claim to this definition of its mission is inherent in the nature of the socialist state and social order. With the social liberation of the working class and the working people from capitalist exploitation there also then ultimately disappears the power of those class forces which, typically, want war and the enslavement of other peoples. Securing the peace becomes a socialist state doctrine. That generates, "in contrast to the old society with its economic misery and political insanity, a new society the international principle of which would be peace,"--as Karl Marx foresaw it--"because the same principle would prevail for every nation--and it would be labor."³

Our allegiance to peace, our struggle for security and detente, is therefore not only a current question of contemporary class struggle, but a characteristic of the working class, in power in the socialist countries, an essential feature of its entire policy and moral stance.

However much the ideologists of the cold war and of imperialist adventurous policy, time and again, resort to their old mendacious contentions of an alleged threat to the "free world" by the communists, what turns out to be true is that the socialist states, firmly rallied around the Soviet Union, are the ones that, together with the forces of peace and progress in the whole world, more and more push back the aggressive forces, struggling to make irreversible the results in the struggle for peace and detente. Knowing this, and through the firm will to contribute to socialist national defense and thus, to securing the peace, the motives for action are consolidating too. These political-moral value criteria in our defense efforts are a prominent expression of the advantages and superiority of socialism.

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Imperialist "Defense" Motivation in Distress

There are quite a few imperialist ideologists and manipulators of opinion who are trying very hard and not missing a psychological trick to turn the imperialist armies, the executors of the imperialist policy of aggression, into servants of peace. And doing so, they still want to appear credible to boot. That is not a new manner of posturing. The ideologists and operators of the imperialist policy of aggression had no hesitation in the past either to engage in verbose espousals of peace.

Today, the worldwide interest the peoples have in securing the peace, the fighting front of the peace forces, has become so all-inclusive that it reached down into the most diverse political trends and groups, including parliamentary and government circles in the capitalist countries. Not even the most militant forces in the imperialist camp can do without advocating peace, as pretense for all their demagogic machinations. In the military journals of the FRG, such as WEHRKUNDE, and in the Bundeswehr training materials, "Information for the Troops," and in other publications, one finds time and again contributions dealing with the design of a positive defense motivation.

As the credibility of the anticommunist slogans of the "threat by communism" is eroding, the most important fulcrum for the defense motivation of the imperialist armies is going down. And so one has for some time been looking for defense motives that might still appear credible, and serve the desire for aggression, in a politically relaxed climate. More and more frequently they are advertising in the imperialist armies as defense motives concepts such as "safeguarding of peace," "organizing peace," or "crisis control."

They do of course at once offer qualifications here and confess that, obviously, that side can be only of a secondary function. Some of them think it rather absurd "to ask a soldier to prevent war," since "a soldier must be trained neither to live nor to die, but to fight."⁴ Greater attention to so-called positive defense motives of necessity runs into the question of what is worthy to be defended under the conditions of imperialist rule. An article in "Information for the Troops" (No 3, 1973) very correctly expresses that an army's motivation essentially comes "from a firm conviction to be fighting for a good cause," but then at once it must admit "that youth is no longer sufficiently motivated, by the substance of it. It is no longer--or no longer adequately--convinced that the cause one stands for is a good cause." They are bewailing the fact that the "traditional ideas like home and fatherland" are no longer adequate defense motives and that abstract formulas on "the preservation of an order of law and freedom" no longer meet with sufficient resonance either. And actually, increasing social insecurity, the crisis situation in the imperialist states, the upsurge of inflation

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and of unemployment--in June alone the FRG unemployment offices registered 645,800 unemployed and persons partly laid off--, are hardly the things that would make that imperialist system appear worthy of defending. The constant modeling of new designs, of models in military psychology and of "defense motives" shows how imperialism is getting into more and more of a tight spot in the area of defense manipulation. This does not mean that we will ever underestimate the effect mechanisms and influence possibilities imperialism still has in this area.

Its bearing, its aggressive adventurist character, its psychological sophistication, by which the aims and intentions of imperialism and its aggression are meant to be covered up, never leave us in doubt that the army under imperialism is a tool of aggression. The dilemma of its defense motivation shows too how obsolete imperialism is and how unable to safeguard the vital interests of the peoples.

Using the Great Variety of Socialist Defense Motives

The interest in securing the peace as a dominant defense motive by the citizens in our republic is inseparably connected with the interest in the protection of socialism, with the conviction of the defense-worthiness of the socialist fatherland, and with the desire to find effective protection from any imperialist threat.

The socialist defense motive, born from the allegiance to its socialist state and to socialist society, has deep roots in socialist internationalism. To the citizens in our republic, not only is their socialist fatherland worthy of defending but, above and beyond it, the entire community of socialist states. Internationalist thinking and a sense of responsibility for their common protection, and the knowledge that the contribution to the protection of socialism and to the safeguarding of peace is important, these are the things that determine the attitudes of more and more people in our society.

In all the priority importance of the "purpose," the development of socialist defense motives is not conceivable without a firm class point of view in judging the forces of imperialism. And the socialist states have never held on to stereotypes in forming the picture of the enemy--as imperialist propaganda would have it. They do not derive their need for defense efforts and their image of the enemy exclusively from current events.

FOOTNOTES

1. "Communique of the Conference of the Political Advisory Commission of the Warsaw Pact Member States." In: NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (B edition), 19 April 1974.

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2. Cf. A. Yepichev: "The Historical Mission of the Army of the Socialist States." In: EINHEIT (Berlin), No 8, 1972, p 1083 f.
3. Karl Marx and F. Engels: "Werke" ("Works"), Vol 17, Berlin, 1962, p 7.
4. H. Karst: "Das Bild des Soldaten" ("The Soldier Image"), Boppard/Rhine, 1964, p 14.

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CLASS STRUGGLE TO CONTINUE IN SPITE OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Dec 74 pp 39-44

[By Dr Klaus Franke and Dr Horst Mueller]

[Text] We stand today at a decisive point in international relations: the turn from cold war to detente has been initiated. Now the important thing is to make this process irreversible on a worldwide basis and to achieve further results.

The advancing implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence has created more favorable foreign policy conditions for the building of socialism and the development of socialist society. At the same time, the unified and constructive peace policy by the socialist countries, based on the peace program that was decided on by the 24th CPSU Congress, has led to the defeat of aggressive and expansionist strategies and doctrines of imperialism. Imperialism has been forced, especially by the power and influence of the socialist community of states, to accommodate to the new power ratio in the world. Yet that accommodation is not a passive reaction by imperialism to the changed conditions of its existence. Within the framework of that accommodation imperialism is developing great activities toward being able to realize its expansionist aims even under the changed relations. This accommodation by imperialism to its changed conditions of existence furthermore is an active reaction to social processes in the world which objectively oppose imperialism and its power drive and aggressive intent, and which keep gaining strength and influence. Simultaneously, the common revolutionary policy by the Soviet Union, the GDR and the other fraternal countries furthers "a certain slackening of the world capitalist system and contributes toward

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intensifying its contradictions."¹ Based on the offensive policy of the socialist community of states, the more and more coordinated cooperation among the three main revolutionary currents of our times and among all other democratic forces has thus brought about changes in international relations that are restraining more and more the aggressive endeavors of imperialism and favor the struggle by the antimonopolist forces in the capitalist countries.

The turn from the cold war to detente is a complicated and also a contradictory process. The possibility of sudden changes in international politics exists, and so does that of a sharpening of the struggle in various sectors of the anti-imperialist front. The struggle for the further implementation of the principles of peaceful coexistence thus calls for a maximum of firmness of principle and elasticity, and of handling the constructive compromise, by the socialist community of states and the other peace forces as well.

Peaceful Coexistence and the Confrontation between Socialism and Imperialism

The struggle for implementing peaceful coexistence and the international detente has taught us as the most important lesson that our successes are all the greater, the stronger socialism is. The military strength of socialism is the indispensable prerequisite for the struggle for peace and peaceful coexistence. At the present time, any diminution in our defense readiness and defense ability could tempt the imperialist class enemy to enforce his aggressive aims again by military means. We do everything in our power therefore "to strengthen the defense ability of socialism in close union with the Soviet Union and the other fraternal countries and to develop the national defense system of the GDR in line with the obligations arising from our socialist alliance and the tasks set out by the Eighth Party Congress."²

Any discussion of the relations between socialist and imperialist states must point out from the start that imperialism has not given up its strategic objective--the elimination of socialism and the incorporation of the territories of the socialist countries within the power and influence sphere of imperialist exploitation. Even under the conditions of the changed power ratio, the imperialist forces are seeking to carry out their aims. That applies also to the confrontation under the conditions of peaceful coexistence. Each side pursues aims through peaceful coexistence that are appropriate to the nature of its system. Blurring these facts would permit dangerous illusions to develop. But socialism and imperialism cannot be placed on the same level. Peaceful coexistence is in harmony with the nature and objectives of socialism and must be carried out against the aggressive nature of imperialism.

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Since the first socialist state came into existence, every initiative toward peace, detente and peaceful coexistence has come from the Soviet Union. The realization of these initiatives depended--and of course still depends today--on the concretely extant power ratio and moves through various phases.

Right after 1917, the Soviet Union aimed its policy of peaceful coexistence at ending the counter-revolutionary imperialist intervention and at securing for the first socialist state in the world a breathing spell in its confrontation with world imperialism, extending it as long as possible. The young Soviet power, with its peace decree, declared the principles of peaceful coexistence to be the fundamental principles of socialist foreign policy. The peace decree and other foreign policy documents in the early '20's proclaimed the principles of peace, international security, equal rights, and cooperation among the states irrespective of their social systems. Lenin proceeded from the proposition that he would develop only those principles that had chances to be realized. The principles formulated in the peace decree "accorded with the changed world political relations, with the legal consciousness of the peace-loving democratic forces in general, and of the working classes in particular."³ Elsewhere, in logically continuing this thought, Lenin said: "We do not throw the bourgeois-democratic slogans overboard but carry out more consistently, completely and decisively what is democratic in them."⁴ The principles of peaceful coexistence as developed by Lenin thus were formulated from the start, in a manner that they would meet with the interest and understanding of more and more segments of the population in the imperialist countries.

The Leninist policy aimed at enforcing the principle of the renunciation of force. The peace decree terms aggressive wars "the greatest crimes against humanity."⁵ Lenin constantly opposed the principle of the renunciation of force to the imperialist policy of strength. At the same time Lenin pointed out that Soviet Russia did not thereby exclude the possibility of legitimately applying force against aggressors. This gave the young Soviet Union the task to become militarily strong in order to restrain any aggressor and "cure" him of aggressive acts. From its very beginning, the CPSU focused on the protection of its territory, the safeguarding of peace and international security. The CPSU proceeded from the proposition that great military strength and a consistent policy of peace and relaxation do not exclude but depend on each other in socialist society. It is the conflict over deciding the question "who--whom?" on a world scale which proves, precisely, in many ways that socialism and peace form an inseparable unity.

After the young Soviet Union in the course of the '20's could break out of its foreign policy isolation imposed by the imperialist states, it

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increasingly applied its international influence to creating the principle of a collective restraint on aggressors by a system of reciprocal arms aid. It succeeded in some initial respects but was not fully applied.⁶

The emergence and development of the socialist community of states changed the power ratio in the world fundamentally. Today there exists the real chance for avoiding a world war and securing the peace for generations. This possibility places the enforcing of the principles of peaceful coexistence in a new dimension on the agenda of world politics. The substance of the principles of peaceful coexistence has been significantly broadened by the new possibilities that the current power ratio offers us. It is now no longer a matter of extending a peaceful "breathing spell" in the relations between the states belonging to two different social orders. Rather, it is becoming more and more a matter of excluding war from these relations altogether. At the present the transition from confrontation to gradual cooperation in important fields such as the economy, health, science and culture is taking place on the firm foundation of the strong socialist community of states.

From this state of affairs, false conclusions are variously still being drawn. Especially Maoist and other ultra-leftist groups and "theoreticians" often contend, erroneously, that the policy of peaceful coexistence by the socialist community of states, mainly by the Soviet Union, led to a consolidation of the social and political status quo in Europe and other parts of the world. From that they deduce that the socialist countries were taking a defensive position in the struggle against imperialism, thereby hurting the communist and revolutionary movement. Maoist and Trotskyite groups in Western Europe are denigrating the implementation of peaceful coexistence as "class betrayal" and as "renouncing the revolutionary struggle." However, peaceful coexistence is and will remain in the future the decisive form of revolutionary struggle on the international level, aimed at preventing war between socialist and imperialist countries as well as carrying on the unavoidable class conflicts between socialism and imperialism, albeit in a non-military manner. Peaceful coexistence is neither class betrayal nor a renouncing of the revolutionary struggle but rather a form of sharp class conflict between states with opposite social orders in the political, economic and ideological field.

The worldwide confrontation between socialism and imperialism is unavoidable. The confrontation front has become broader, more varied and multi-layered. It comprises all domains of public life: the economy and foreign policy, culture and sports, education and social affairs. At present the confrontation is particularly conspicuous in the ideological field. The struggle of ideas and ideologies has assumed a global character.

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The Aggressive Character of Imperialism Today

Two tendencies are typical of imperialist policy today. For one thing it is forced more and more to recognize the principles of peaceful co-existence, and second, the objectives that accord with its aggressive nature are working against a stable order of peace in the world. These diverse tendencies are reflected in the formulation of the so-called double strategy of "security and detente." The concept of "security policy" barely hides the intention of imperialism with its aggressive objectives vis-a-vis the socialist states which--should the power ratio in the world allow it--also is to be carried out by the "classical" means of the threat and application of force. The concept of "detente policy" came about through imperialism being coerced into adopting to peaceful coexistence; by it, imperialism means to give the impression as if, in the international process of relaxation, the initiative had also come from imperialist states, as if the aggressive character of imperialism had changed.

One can quickly unmask the nature of this imperialist strategy if one examines the emphases placed on the two sides of the double strategy by the imperialist politicians, ideologists and military men. They are virtually unanimous in the view that the "security policy," that is the policy of rearmament and of making material preparations for an imperialist threat and application of military force, has priority over the "detente policy." Insofar as possible under changed conditions of existence, imperialism is engaged in military aggressive policy, and only when forced into it, willing to engage in "detente policy." And with all this, authoritative politicians and ideologists of imperialism mean anything but a departure from its aggressive, antisocialist objectives by such a policy. All they are concerned about is to apply methods that will ensure the realization of their goals even under the conditions that force them into peaceful coexistence and into giving up their threats and application of military force against socialism.

Since enforcing the principles of peaceful coexistence in international relations does not change the nature of imperialism and its aggressive character, one may summarize the results from the imperialist reaction to the coercion into peaceful coexistence, in the form of its "double strategy," in two important conclusions.

(1) The preparation of the threat and application of military force, represented as "security policy," is the basic feature of imperialist strategy against socialism. It is the declared fulcrum of that strategy. That alone makes it understandable that, for example, authoritative ideologists of U.S. imperialism have still not banished imperialist war from their ideas about the future. Two years ago, for example, Hermann Kahn prognosticated as follows: "In fact, the likelihood of a larger

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war will grow, mainly, in the late '70's."⁷ Yet if it should not work out precisely like that, Kahn says in the same text, "a relapse could occur to the forms that were typical of the cold war." The director of the Russian Institute at Columbia University in the United States, D. Shulman, announced in 1974, in the same spirit, "that it could be possible and even likely that we will go through periods when the policy of peaceful coexistence (sic) enters a belligerent stage."⁸

(2) The "detente policy," enforced through the change in the power ratio, in favor of socialism and all other peace forces in the world, does not mean at all that aggressive imperialist goals are abandoned. Imperialist politicians and military men subordinate it under the "fulcrum" of the security policy and declare it to be a means for seeking other ways through which to reach their unchanged objectives. In that sense, the FRG Chancellor Helmut Schmidt stated a year ago: "The struggle for shifts in power, influence spheres and the implementation of political objectives (the realization of aggressive imperialist interests) moves into other fields--the economic, political and ideological field."⁹

What imperialism really aims at in this is indicated, for example, by the often varied and disseminated thesis of the ideologists and politicians of monopoly capital on the so-called unrestricted "exchange of persons, ideas and information." This focuses on an "increasing slackening of the communist social system."¹⁰ What one aims at is the "Western Europe's world of ideas can enter Eastern Europe unhindered and that from such changes in the spiritual landscape of Europe the justification for changes in its political conditions and alliances can be derived."¹¹

The fundamental objective of the entire imperialist policy vis-a-vis the socialist camp thus has remained unchanged. What imperialism cannot achieve by the military means of a "roll back," it now wants to enforce through other means, for example by the "erosion of socialism" or by "bridge building." And there the unity of the "policy of security and detente" as well as the priorities established for it clearly indicate that imperialism today aims at such a change in power relations, by non-military means, which would enable it to bring the struggle back again onto the military level, the level most in harmony with the unchanged aggressive nature of imperialism. The struggle is hard and relentless on all these different levels. The central concern here is the task to eliminate war as a means for solving antagonistic contradictions between socialist and imperialist states, achieve further successes through peaceful coexistence, and create more favorable conditions for the building of socialism/communism.

In the increasing worldwide confrontation between socialism and imperialism we are also giving attention to a remark by Lenin, reminding us of the dialectical reciprocal relationship between the content and form of

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the monopolies' struggle for realizing their interests: The "form of struggle may change and changes constantly, but the nature of the struggle, its class content, cannot change at all as long as classes exist."¹²

FOOTNOTES

1. E. Honecker: "Fresh Successes on the 25th Anniversary of the German Democratic Republic. From the Concluding Speech by Comrade Erich Honecker." In: "12. Tagung des ZK der SED, 4-5 July 1974" (Twelfth SED Central Committee Session, 4-5 July 1974), Berlin, 1974, p 103.
2. Ibid., p 104.
3. V. I. Lenin: "Werke" ("Works"), Vol 26, Berlin, 1961, p 240.
4. Ibid., Vol 39, Berlin, 1965, p 773.
5. Ibid., Vol 26, loc. cit.
6. Cf., for example, the agreement between the CSSR and the USSR on mutual assistance in case of military aggression, of 1935.
7. H. Kahn: "Angriff auf die Zukunft. Die 70er und 80er Jahre: So Werden wir Leben" (Attack on the Future. The '70's and '80's: That is how we will live). Vienna, 1972, p 62.
8. D. Shulman: "Concerning a Western Conception of Coexistence and Collaboration." In: DAS PARLAMENT (Bonn), 2 Feb 74, Supplement, p 13.
9. H. Schmidt: "The Power Balance." In: WEHRKUNDE (Munich). No 10, 1973, p 503.
10. FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU (Frankfurt/Main), 23 Nov 72.
11. DIE WELT (Hamburg), 2 Jan 73.
12. V. I. Lenin: op. cit., Vol 22, Berlin, 1960, p 157.

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WARSAW PACT ASSISTANCE TO ARAB COUNTRIES DISCUSSED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Dec 74 pp 31-38

[By Lt Col Dr D. Groll of the Friedrich Engels Military Academy]

Excerpt If the power of socialism did not stand in imperialism's way, obstructing it and warning it, "it would employ its powerful militarist suppression machinery fully everywhere."¹

This fact also makes clear that in the international class conflict with imperialism, an extraordinary importance is attached to the socialist military policy of the Warsaw Pact states under the Soviet Union's leadership. This military policy not only aims at maintaining the achievements of the socialist revolution and at protecting world peace, it also supports the legitimate rights and interests of all the peoples fighting against imperialist oppression and exploitation, especially their right to self-determination. An outstanding role in this is played by the socialist military coalition, the military main force in the socialist camp. The Warsaw Pact of 1955 guarantees the security and protection of the socialist family of nations. At the same time it curbs the aggressive activities of the imperialist military groups vis-a-vis the national liberation movement.

Socialism triumphant has been and is that one factor which, in cooperation with the revolutionary forces of the national liberation movement, puts chains on the mechanism of the military "penal expeditions" of the imperialist states, making sure that imperialism today can no longer use its war machine without restraint against the national liberation movement.

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The course of international events, especially since the socialist community of states came into being, has shown how extremely close and organic the links are between the growing power of the socialist world system and the successes in the revolutionary struggle for national liberation. Characteristic of this is the fact that the national liberation movements triumphed in vast areas of the world at the very moment when the socialist world system became the determining factor in international affairs. The socialist world system drew the main forces of imperialism onto itself, screened the newly liberated countries ever more successfully against the export of the counterrevolution, and eliminated the imperialist states' trade monopolies with these countries. Thereby it significantly weakened the threats of neocolonialism and created for the liberated countries favorable external conditions for the struggle and realization of social progress.

The military aid and assistance given by the socialist states for decades extend in various directions that are closely connected. It ranges from reliable protection for the socialist community of states, the main impulse to social progress and the most important international basis and support for the national liberation movement, by the armies of the socialist military coalition, to paralyzing the military forces of the NATO states, and includes training and arms support for the Arab armies. In response to the Arab states' government requests, and in order to safeguard the security interests of the forces in the worldwide revolutionary movement,--dependent on the actions planned or taken by imperialism--the socialist states have always extended the necessary amount of military aid. They also thus realize in the military domain what V. I. Lenin pointed out when he wrote: "Internationalism does not consist of slogans, assurances of solidarity or resolutions, but of deeds."²

The main share in military aid is borne by the Soviet Union and its armed forces. But the GDR too and its NVA, as best it could, as much as the other states and armies of the Warsaw Pact, has made its contribution in the military-political field to supporting the struggle by the Arab liberation movement. The SED and the GDR government always took into account in its military policy that the aggressive policy of imperialism can successfully be countered and dealt the defeat it deserves only when the socialist community of states stands up in unified and cohesive action. In agreement with the position taken by the Soviet Union and the other fraternal socialist countries, the GDR advocates "the solution of the Near Eastern conflict on the basis of the U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338." It supports this point of view: "Establishing a just and lasting peace in that area is possible only if the Israeli occupation troops are withdrawn from all Arab territories occupied in June 1967 and the legitimate rights of the Arab people of Palestine are ensured."³

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The GDR is making its main contribution to supporting the struggle by the Arab peoples primarily along the main military line of confrontation between socialism and imperialism in Europe. The NVA members, in solidarity with the Arab liberation movement, have always acted in the proper awareness that ensuring our military superiority in maintaining and securing peace in Europe is of decisive importance to the struggle by the progressive Arab forces.

Strengthening Socialism in Europe Also Serves the Struggle by the Arab Peoples

The importance of the peace-preserving role of socialist foreign and military policy on the European continent to the Arab peoples' struggle against imperialism and Zionism has mainly consisted and consists of the following:

In the worldwide class conflict between socialism and imperialism, Europe occupies a central place. Europe is the cradle of Marxism-Leninism and of the revolutionary labor movement and the continent with the numerically strongest and best organized working class, the main guiding impulse to social progress in our times. The majority of the European population lives in socialist states, and more than two thirds of the European territory are socialist. Here lies the main line of confrontation between the two opposing social systems.

Europe is the most important arena of the tense class struggle between socialism and imperialism. Here they have their greatest economic, political and military potentials, and here the strongest military groups are facing each other directly. "War in Europe, in contradiction to Indochina or the Near East, would mean thermonuclear world war. Firm peace and peaceful coexistence in Europe, on the other hand, improve the chances to secure world peace and to restrain and extinguish local hotbeds of war in other parts."⁴

In the form of the socialist states of Europe, the working class in the capitalist states and the national liberation movement in Asia, Africa and Latin America have their greatest source of strength for their own struggle against imperialism and neocolonialism, and for national and social freedom.

The course of the class struggle in this area, every change in favor of socialism, has far-reaching effects on the struggle by the three main revolutionary currents. Every success in the struggle against imperialism in Europe means not only a step forward toward permanent peace in our part of the world, it also strikes again against the policy of strength and the system of the interconnected aggressive military pacts by which imperialism encircles the globe. Important decisions on the class struggle are thus made in Europe, on a world scope and so also for the struggle by the Arab peoples.

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In Europe the main military forces of imperialism are tied down by the socialist military coalition. The military power ratio in Europe and the constructive foreign and military policy by the socialist states do not allow the aggressive forces of the NATO states to use their military power as pressure against the progressive Arab regimes. It turns out that the active peace policy by the Warsaw Pact states in connection with the military strength of the socialist armies lead to an increasing degree to limiting the freedom to act and the action radius of aggressive imperialist policy. It is reflected by their hopelessness in carrying out their aggressive plans against the socialist states and becomes equally evident in the impossibility imperialism faces to liquidate progressive developments in various Arab states by military aggression. The Warsaw Pact states' coordinated foreign and military policy on preserving the peace and settling urgent European problems, security as well as European cooperation, creates the possibility for significantly improving the climate of international relations. This greatly facilitates creating the kind of international conditions that will ultimately make it possible to put out smoldering conflicts kindled by imperialism and also to bring to a just political solution the dangerous situation that has come about through Israel's aggressions in the Near East. A military-political aspect of this process mainly lies in the imperialist governments finding themselves forced to wriggle and wangle more, in the military field as well as in overall policy, and to camouflage their aggressive militant neocolonialist plans against the Arab liberation movement by some peace and detente demagogy.

Our Internationalist Fulfillment of Duty to the National Liberation Movement: Secure Military Protection of Socialism

The socialist military policy and the superior socialist military power as well as the high defense preparedness and ability of the peoples in the socialist community of states have been and are the essential preconditions for creating favorable external conditions for further strengthening socialism and communism. They help the socialist community of states in bringing to bear, faster and with less interference, its superiority in the main field of the conflict between socialism and imperialism, in economic competition, which will further expedite the revolutionary processes. Above all, the economic strength of socialism allows the progressive Arab states to deepen their foreign-trade and scientific-technical relations with the socialist countries. This enables them to close many gaps through which neocolonialism seeks to penetrate.

The socialist soldier personality is shaped by these insights also, in no mean manner. Brought up in the internationalist spirit by the Marxist-Leninist party, socialist soldiers have profound sympathy with all peoples fighting on the anti-imperialist front for a happier future. In its

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ideological work among army personnel, our party and army leadership takes into account that patriotism, internationalism and revolutionary solidarity with the national liberation movement are important moral-political motivating sources in NVA military service.

It is an essential aspect of our ideological work to educate army personnel toward close class-bound alliance with the peoples that are fighting for their freedom in defense against imperialist assaults. It serves to form a fighter who is completely clear about his basic position in the international class conflict and who is fully aware of his internationalist responsibility to the socialist community of states, the international labor movement and the national liberation movement.

Being educated in proletarian internationalism and the peoples' solidarity based on it, one receives a deeper awareness that the secure military protection for the states of socialism as it truly exists, alongside the fraternal armies, also is an expression of an internationalist fulfillment of duty toward the national liberation movement.

FOOTNOTES

1. W. Lamberz: "Ideologische Probleme der Auswertung des VIII. Parteitages der SED" (Ideological Problems in the Exploitation of the Eighth SED Congress), Berlin, 1971, p 20.
2. V. I. Lenin: "Werke" ("Works"), Vol 26, Berlin, 1961, p 64.
3. H. Axen: "From the Politburo Report to the 12th SED Central Committee Session." In: "12. Tagung des Zentralkomitees" (Twelfth Central Committee Session), Berlin, 1974, p 64.
4. H. Axen: "Fragen der Internationalen Lage und der Internationalen Beziehungen der SED" (Questions of the International Situation and of the International Relations of the SED), Berlin, 1974, p 12.

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DISCIPLINARY PROBLEMS INDICATED IN NVA

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Dec 74 pp 54-59

[Lt Col H. Haertel, lawyer of the Friedrich Engels Military Academy]

/Text/ The superior military might of the socialist community of states provides the decisive guarantee for peace and security in the world-wide class struggle between socialism and imperialism. Based on this recognition the Ninth Delegates Conference of the SED party organizations in the NVA and of the border troops of the GDR has established qualitatively new measures for the fulfillment of the main military task: "In the struggle for the continuous raising of the level of combat readiness we evaluate a socialist consciousness and the combat morale, combat training, socialist competition, service and living conditions, and not least of all, scientific leadership activity as those factors on which we have to concentrate on a priority basis."¹

This includes a new level of quality in the work with socialist justice which will be commensurate with the steadily growing demands placed on the combat and mobilization readiness of the leadership organs, of the military formations and troop units, services, military district commands and installations.

Even though we have visible progress in the accomplishment of socialist law since the SED Eighth Party Congress, we cannot rest on our laurels because it is important "that everywhere in the daily life of our society we make the observance of socialist law and conscious discipline the firm habit of the people..."² In the work with troops this is mostly a leadership task for all supervisors. This task includes political-ideological, military and juridical as well as technical and organizational aspects.

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What characterizes the nature of law and lawfulness of our worker and peasant power, in what does its significance consist for the strengthening of military discipline and order, and which demands are placed by our legal system on the class consciousness of superiors and subordinates?

The Class Character of Socialist Law

Laws, regulations and other legal norms are important instruments of the ruling working class for the organization and the leadership of society. There is no basic political or organizational question that does not get decided by appropriate directives of the ruling working class. The principles and guidelines of socialist law are formed by the decisions and directives of the SED. The class will expressed in the decisions and the juridical laws that are based on these decisions have their roots in the economic basis of society because the decisive inter-relationship in the base-to-superstructure relations is the interdependence between politics and economics. This fact was observed in all its aspects by the classical writers of Marxism-Leninism and has been scientifically demonstrated. The work of Karl Marx, for example, which is entitled "Introduction to a Critique of Political Economy," contains the observation that "each form of production creates its own legal relationships and forms of government, etc..."³ The legal order created on the basis of objective conditions is once again a political element because a law is politics.⁴

What distinguishes law as a political factor from the other techniques of the exercise of power; what characterizes its specific role and function is its constitutionally obligatory content binding on all citizens and on all state, economic and social institutions, the realization of which is guaranteed by the might of the state and, if necessary, is enforced in legally stipulated cases. "Just as in the individual human being all motivations for his actions go through his head, and are transformed into the sources of his willful conduct to bring him to action, in the same way all the requirements of society--irrespective of which social class is ruling at the moment--have to go through the will of the state in order to receive universal validity in the form of laws."⁵ "The will, when it is expressed by the state must be expressed as a law determined by the state power, otherwise the word 'will' is only an empty sound that disappears in the air."⁶

Our socialist law therefore is not merely the materially-determined expression of the will of the ruling working class, but the will of the state raised to the level of a law that is binding on everyone. While the law is not the sole form of the realization of the policy of the working class, it is "certainly the sole form...in which the state expresses its directives in a manner binding on everyone."⁷

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This is expressed in the career service regulation of the NVA dated 10 December 1973 which states that army members are obligated "to observe the constitution, the laws and other legal regulations as well as the orders, service regulations and other instructions of the Minister for National Defense and their lawfully competent superior officers and to carry these out with the exercise of creative initiative..."⁸ The political and legal consequences of this legal norm are of great significance for the strengthening of military order and discipline. Formations, service and troop units must understand them fully and accomplish them consciously. Socialist law is far more than merely one means for the resolution of conflicts or for the punishment of violators; it becomes in the hands of the single military leader primarily an important instrument in troop leadership and in the steady maintenance of a high degree of combat readiness.

Lawfulness and Maintenance of Order, Discipline and Security

The effectiveness of the laws and other legal regulations of the GDR within the NVA and border troops of the GDR depends to a high degree on the extent to which the commanders and political workers are familiar with and carry through the legal regulations that govern their activities-- which is a basic requirement of socialist legality. This effectiveness is derived from the class character of our state and the legal order that is based on it. The strict realization of this requirement is essential because otherwise no correct political solution of the tasks can be accomplished. Every unlawful action is damaging, can lead to anarchistic deviations and arbitrariness. Already V. I. Lenin demanded emphatically that it is necessary to follow conscientiously the laws and orders of the worker and peasant power because even the smallest unlawfulness provides a breach that becomes immediately exploited by the enemies of the working masses.⁹

For this reason our party requires of all state and economic functionaries that "they respect the legal norms without any mental reservation and that they make the maintenance of order, discipline and security a permanent component of their managerial activity."¹⁰ This applies as well to the leadership of troops because lawfulness strengthens the exercise of individual military leadership. It allows, for instance, only those decisions which are reconcilable in every respect with the requirements and demands of law and legality. This applies equally to measures that are based solely on military orders, regulations, directives and other military regulations as well as to those that are taken in reference to specific legal norms or that are based exclusively on legal norms. Two main considerations of socialist legal security have to be constantly kept in mind in this: first of all, the requirements resulting from the need to maintain a permanently high state of combat readiness; and secondly, the strict observance of the legal rights of army members and border troop soldiers.

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The exemplary realization of socialist legality on the part of the commanders is an important factor in strengthening the trust and confidence of subordinates in the policies of our party and our state. This requires a politically and substantively competent decision, in order to "better fulfill the tasks of strengthening the legal order, military discipline and order in the services and troop units."¹¹ This requirement placed by Army General A. Yeplichev on the commanders of the Soviet Army and Navy also applies in its meaning to the National People's Army and to the border troops of the GDR. A few examples taken from our service regulation DV 010/0/003--Internal Service--are intended to illustrate this point.

Section 10 contains the principle that "the responsibility as well as the specific rights and duties of the superior"...result from..."the decisions of the party and state leadership as well as from the legal regulations and the military instructions..."

Section 10c, obligates the superiors "to lead their subordinates in combat in such a way that the combat tasks are fulfilled and the victory is gained over the enemy..., (and) the international legal norms, especially the Geneva and Prague Conventions are observed..."

Section 10g requires superiors "to fulfill those tasks within their area of competence and responsibility that derive from paragraph 2 of the Penal Code (STGB)...in connection with paragraph 254, title 1 of the Penal Code."

Section 10i makes the superiors "responsible for the observance and accomplishment of the health, accident and fire protection services..." and requires them "to take all necessary safety measures on the basis of the legal norms and service regulations and to instruct and orient their subordinates accordingly."

Section 10p obligates superiors to conduct "a conscientious review of complaints and grievances on the basis of the constitution of the GDR... of the legal norms...and of the service regulations." The general duty to observe the socialist legality is not possible without a thorough familiarity of the domestic and international legal norms that apply in the specific case. Failures in this area always have more or less negative results. "If the thread is torn concerning a single detail, there is a loss of time and the combat readiness even is put into question."¹²

This takes place unavoidably where commanders permit the violation of legal norms; when orders are given or sanctioned that are in violation of the legal norms. When there are decisions of this kind in individual cases, the deviation from the legal norms is most often justified as

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"appropriate and expedient." We cannot agree with this argumentation." in the words of comrade Friedrich Ebert, "as long as views are stated and practiced which oppose the strict observance of legal norms to the tasks of plan fulfillment and which are then interpreted to place expediency before legality."¹³

Decisions of this kind should not be taken in the military sector either. The great decision responsibilities placed in the integral command function of the individual military leader put a high stake on the sense of responsibility of all commanders and military superiors. The creative application in the daily military life of the rights and duties of the individual particularly in the work with troops demands a conscientious observance of the legal norms, because our legal order, as the expression of the might of the working class, is our socialist class law. And no one is authorized to deviate from it arbitrarily. No compromises can or may be made in this sector.

The legal security of troop leadership demands, furthermore, that standard and unified legal criteria are applied throughout for all the laws and regulations promulgated for the NVA and the border troops of the GDR. Just as we in the GDR "do not use a law of Cottbus, or of Karl Marx Stadt..."¹⁴ there can be no special military laws or legal interpretations valid only in the armed forces or separate services. However, the legal duty of all state officials to promote the unified execution of socialist law is by no means directed against a differentiated application appropriate in each case to the prevailing objective conditions. The appropriateness of each decision of an individual military leader in the area of socialist law is defined by the political unity between party decisions and legal norms.

Content and Aim of Legal Propaganda

The prevention of violations of legal norms, in particular the prevention of criminal acts, misdemeanors and infractions of regulations is a task incumbent upon all superiors that is most significant for the purposes of socialist legality and thus for the strengthening of military order and discipline.¹⁵ The struggle against criminality and all other violation of the laws is first of all a political class duty of commanders which has legally binding force according to Paragraph 90 of the Constitution of the GDR as well as Paragraph 3, Section 253, Title 1 of the Penal Code. In no case may it be assumed however that, for instance, the fulfillment of tasks in the political indoctrination, in combat training and in border service training accomplishes everything that is necessary for the prevention of criminal acts. Since criminality represents a specific social phenomenon it must be dealt with accordingly beyond the general educational objectives. This is the concern not only of the penal and other juridical measures of the military justice authorities and of

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the commanders and political workers, but of the party and FDJ youth organizations, of the army sports collectives, of the military combat collectives as well as of each individual army member and border soldier. This involves primarily the purposeful strengthening of the legal consciousness in the doctrinal formation of socialist class fighters and in the strengthening of their basic socialist convictions. Class-conscious attitudes and modes of conduct however are not created by themselves as is well known; they must be continually trained and strengthened. Socialist law too does not exert a disciplining and educational influence by its mere existence. "It must be known and must be applied consciously. Only then does it serve as the expression of a social sense of consciousness of the citizens and of their collectives and promote their conscious participation in the solution of the social tasks."¹⁶

This recognition now places new requirements on the dissemination of legal knowledge within the NVA and the border troops of the GDR that is pertinent to the troop, combat and general military practices.

Obviously the content, form and variety of the best legal propaganda cannot by itself, so to speak automatically, prevent legal infractions and violations of discipline. It is a priority task of the legal propaganda to create thought processes and modes of conduct that conform to the political-moral and legal requirements. This becomes a case of insight into the requirements of the society, which, under socialism, are always objectively in the interests of all the working masses. Since the daily life and the total activity of the NVA and of the border troops of the GDR is based in all respects on legal norms, "the knowledge and concepts of army members derived from their military service, from military discipline, from the handling of weapons and of combat equipment, from their conduct on the battle field, etc. is derived not only from teaching materials, but to a significant extent from the legal norms."¹⁷

A substantial aim of all legal propaganda among troops consists in the development of the insight and conviction that legal norms are required and that their strict and meticulous observance lies in the interest of a dependable military protection of socialism. In this, the commanders and political organs are charged with a great responsibility. They are supported in this activity according to plan by the organs of military justice. The military law collectives also perform an effective legal propaganda activity, which however needs to be exploited in a still more adequate manner. Most useful in this educational activity are also the program series on GDR radio and television, such as "Not Only a Dossier" or "The Floor to the Prosecutor." They can contribute towards the strengthening of the legal consciousness of the army member and to the prevention of legal violations.

The prevention of criminal acts, infractions and violations of discipline however is not exclusively a political-ideological problem of education

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and training but also has administrative-organizational aspects. It requires an organization of the service that corresponds to the legal norms and the military regulations. Where there is order, where confidence and control go in tandem, violations of laws and criminal acts are effectively blocked. The experience with troops demonstrates that a deficient fulfillment of control obligations encourages criminal acts and special incidents. The guaranteeing of socialist legalities by means of a planned, goal-oriented and coordinated preventive work is one of the most important prerequisites for the strengthening of military order and discipline.

Continuous and competent work with the class law of our state power is becoming increasingly essential for the successful accomplishment of our military main task. In view of the growing demands of social and technological development, socialist law gains new levels of significance and effectiveness. The carrying out of the laws and regulations in the NVA and the border troops of the GDR signifies first of all the consistent observance of the career service regulations and of all the other legal norms. The unconditional and creative fulfillment of orders, service regulations, directives and training programs, in duty tasks and border security requires the use of weapons, equipment and installations according to regulations and the economic use of financial and material means. These factors are essential for the attainment of high results in combat training and in the strengthening of military discipline.

From this point of view also military leaders "must realize their individual command activity as a unity of military and political leadership and improve it in a consistent and continuously more effective manner."¹⁸

FOOTNOTES

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2. Report of the Central Committee to the Eighth Party Congress of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany. Speaker: Comrade Erich Honecker, Berlin, 1971, p 67.
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4. V. I. Lenin: "Werke" ("Works"), Vol 23, Berlin, 1957, p 40.
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18. H. Hoffmann: Party Education and Soldiers' Duty. In PARTEIARBEITER (Berlin) Special Issue Ninth Delegates Conference/II, 1974, p 8, MILITAERWESEN (Berlin) No 10, 1973, p 73.

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COMMENTARY CRITICAL OF NATO MANEUVERS

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Dec 74 pp 75-76

[Commentary by J.S.]

/Text/ During September of this year the largest maneuvers to date of the imperialist NATO Pact took place, which involved the participation of not less than 200,000 men with thousands of wheeled and tracked vehicles, as well as hundreds of ships and aircraft: Between 16 and 27 September the "Northern Merger" maneuver in the North Sea and the British Channel brought together more than 200 ships, 750 aircraft and 40,000 men from eight NATO countries. The Bundeswehr contingent consisted of 67 ships and several squadrons of aircraft.

The "Bold Guard" exercise (from 10 to 13 September in Schleswig-Holstein) brought together more than 40,000 men (7,000 Danish and British each, 200 Americans and 26,000 Bundeswehr soldiers) with 8,000 wheeled and 2,500 tracked vehicles.

"Quick Change" took place from 16 to 19 September in the Southwest German, Hessian and Palatinate area. This exercise involved more than 80,000 men (50,000 from the reinforced III Corps of the Bundeswehr, 20,000 from the FRG Air Force and 10,000 from the FRG Territorial Army, of those 8,000 reservists called to active duty under mobilization procedures, 2,300 American and 110 French soldiers) with 13,000 wheeled and 3,600 tracked vehicles, 120 helicopters and 170 aircraft. Almost at the same time the "Hard Nut" maneuver started in the Weserberg area. It involved the 7th Armored Infantry Division with 14,000 men. Moreover, from 1 to 8 September the NATO reconnaissance contest "Big Click" with its operational headquarters on the military airdrome of Leck in

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East Frisia took place with the participation of squadrons from five NATO countries; from 2 to 4 September the "Florett IV" maneuver of the 26th Airborne Brigade in preparation for the "Quick Change" exercise; from 3 to 11 September the reservists' exercise "Small Bell" with 2,000 men on the Bergen-Hohne trop exercise area; from 9 to 11 September the air defense maneuver "Crack Force" took place within the entire NATO Central Europe Command and over parts of Great Britain. From 16 to 24 September the 1st Belgian Division stationed in the FRG mounted the "Peace Oak" exercise in the area of Arolsen with the participation of 9,000 soldiers with 2,000 vehicles, among them 450 tanks.

These and other maneuvers this year covered the entire area of the FRG almost simultaneously with a massive net of large scale military exercises.

What is behind this massive employment of soldiers and war materials?

These maneuvers took place contrary to the continuing detente initiative of the socialist community of states. They show that certain imperialist forces are redoubling their efforts "to perfect the military instrument of NATO and to protect it against the growing crisis phenomena of capitalism."¹ Influential aggressive forces of imperialism are seeking in this way to demonstrate their unity and strength in the military-political and military sectors. They are mounting a campaign against efforts in individual NATO countries that aim at bringing about a reduction of the rapidly increasing arms expenditures and they promote the application of political pressure based on military force in the relations with socialist states. These revanchist forces leave no doubt as to their readiness to make use of their military potential and prove once more that really nothing has changed in the aggressiveness of imperialism.

The same can be said of the official rationale of the NATO forces for these maneuvers. An attempt is made as before (even though more sophisticated methods are being used) to make the forcible rearmament and the experimentation with the military weapons arsenal credible, using the lie about a "threat" and the thesis of the "defensive mission" of the NATO forces, and thus to hide from the public and anti-communist intent and objectives. But no campaign, however refined--even if the enemy forces in NATO maneuvers are no longer referred to as "red" but as "pink"--can successfully deceive observers concerning the true aggressive and anti-detente intentions of the NATO circles. Even the London "Guardian" wrote on 12 September that it was the main task, for instance of "Northern Merger" to "practice combat against the Russians," and to show "how Western military men conceive the next major war in Europe." That this objective of the maneuvers has also gained the applause of the Chinese Maoists should also be noted.

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In their maneuvers the NATO strategists sought to try out their concept of "crisis management." The "precautionary measures" that were employed in these maneuvers in the scenario of the first phase of a crisis, beginning with the long-range reconnaissance flights of the air forces leading to the employment of troops and the mobilization of reservists, permitted the supposition that the situation postulated is not one of detente but one that is tense and is to be escalated to include the employment of military means according to the NATO strategy of "flexible response."

The maneuvers indicated further that the NATO and Bundeswehr leadership is retaining the elements of "conventional warfare" within the framework of "forward defense" and "flexible reaction" without renouncing the various options for the employment of nuclear weapons. In "Quick Change" the cooperation of land and air forces together with units of the Territorial Army was tried for the first time to this extent "in fast-changing situations," particularly in the quick change from "defensive" to offensive operations. Utilization of the entire combat zone, including the "rear combat area," the security of the main routes of advance through units of the Territorial Army, the multiple fording of river obstacles, massed tank and anti-tank operations and the concentrated close support of these by the tactical air forces formed the core of this exercise in order to obtain the "great possible realism" of the combat simulations.

The maneuver was initiated with a "massive fighter-bomber attack" against an airbase, and the rapid dispatch of reinforcements including the mobilization of reservists played an important role. This shows that the "Blitzkrieg" strategists are already trying out in the FRG the methods and testing the experiences of the Israeli aggressors, and that they are attempting to have their concepts adopted.

But the maneuvers also served to demonstrate the increased combat power of the Bundeswehr and helped in the revaluation of the Bundeswehr forces within NATO. What was characteristic in this respect was not only that in the three largest maneuvers the main force contingents were put forth by the Bundeswehr, and that in two of these the direction of the maneuver was in the hands of Bundeswehr generals, but also that speeches full of praise were delivered in the course of the maneuvers by prominent politicians of the FRG such as that of Federal President Scheel and War Minister Leber.

In view of the show of force demonstrated by this maneuver, the socialist states cannot avoid drawing the required conclusions. "The members of the National People's Army," declared comrade Erich Honecker, "will shirk no effort to perform at any time their patriotic and internationalist duty in firm alliance with the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany."²

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FOOTNOTES

1. E. Honecker: "The Growth and Well Being of the GDR--The Result of the Fraternal Alliance" NEUES DEUTSCHLAND (B Edition) 14 Sep 74.
2. Ibid.

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PREPARATION OF 'FAIR OF THE MASTERS OF TOMORROW' DETAILED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Dec 74 pp 113B-115B

[By Rosemarie Zwerg, economist]

/Text/ We intend to publish another article soon that will treat several questions pertaining to the operation of the Fair of the Masters of Tomorrow (MMM). A final article on this subject will deal with a critique of this Fair and provide pointers for its further development. The Editors

The "Fair of the Masters of Tomorrow" is a high point in the formations, services and installations of the NVA. Particularly in these days numerous army members and civilian employees of our service section can look back with justifiable pride on their innovator activity. With their innovations they are making an effective contribution to the further increase of combat power and combat readiness. This is why it becomes important to also organize innovator activity in the future and to conduct it in a goal-oriented manner. This requires that the commanders and troop leaders project the main points to be emphasized in each training year and that they give directives for the organization, preparation and conduct of the MMM.

What is Involved in the Preparations?

Already at its first meeting after the unit fair, the innovator collective is oriented towards the next MMM on the basis of the critique reports on the concluded MMM. The composition of the MMM working group is discussed the location of the next MMM is proposed at the same time.

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The steadily-increasing political-ideological and military-economic significance of the innovator and MMM movement in the fulfillment of the military main task requires a continuous innovator activity that is directed in each case on the main areas of emphasis. A basic prerequisite for the accomplishment of the plan projects without shortfalls or reductions is a well-conceived organization and the most rational employment of the available forces. For this reason the organization of an MMM working group was mandated to the commander of the formation. This permanent honorary working group is active during the entire training year. Fourteen days before the start of the unit fair the working group undertakes tasks exclusively to insure the success of the MMM. It has also proved useful to conduct the unit fair at different unit locations. With this determination the formation commander delegates to the unit commander of the selected unit a larger share of the responsibility for the preparation and conduct of the unit MMM. This involves a great obligation for the troop unit charged with the mounting of the fair. It contributes to the activation of the innovator activity of the army members and civilian employees. At the same time it has a beneficial effect in creating a healthy atmosphere of competition among the troop units of the formation. Besides--and this is a factor that should not be underestimated--this measure helps to reinforce the military political work with the civil population of the respective garrison town.

After the organizational questions mentioned here are solved, it becomes necessary to accomplish gradually such tasks as:

1. The elaboration of the political-ideological goals of the MMM as a component of the training documents;
2. The scheduling of the MMM of the formation and of the troop units and installations;
3. The definition of the leadership concepts for the MMM-movement within the formation.

This should be done with reference to the experiences gained in the previous training years.

The leadership concept should include:

- the political-ideological goals;
- the tasks of army members and civilian employees in the MMM movement;
- the organization of the MMM, as well as
- the forms and methods which are intended to contribute to the attainment of the set goals.

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If we mention the political-ideological goals in first place among the leadership concept, this is intended to express the fact that the Fairs of the Masters of Tomorrow are meant to be a political high point in the life of the services, installations and units. This occasion is to be prepared appropriately and executed with dignity.

A Few Pointers for the Elaboration of the Leadership Concept

The following guidelines must be considered:

--Socialist military policy is an integral part of the policy of our party and state leadership.

--The inviolable alliance of our army members and civilian employees with the members of the glorious Soviet Army represents the firm foundation for the fulfillment of the main military task.

--The MMM movement is an inseparable part of the socialist youth policy of our state.

It must further be expressed that the army members and civilian employees of the NVA--supported by the leading force of the party organization and by the initiative of the socialist youth association--are documenting their affection for the GDR and their special responsibility in the troop units and their increased defense readiness with excellent performance in all military sectors. If the leadership concept for the respective training year is available, the following tasks are to be realized:

--the elaboration of the planned measures of the innovators;

--the definition of the themes and goals for the meetings and training seminars with the functionaries of the innovator and youth work activity in the services and installations;

--the preparation of the "Days of the Innovators" in the services and installations and the

--elaboration of the MMM organizational concept.

The points of emphasis mentioned above represent the most substantive side of the preparation of the MMM. As already stated, the MMM has great importance as a component part and high point of the innovator movement in the NVA. Under no circumstances should it be left only to the officials charged with innovator activity to prepare and conduct the MMM. The innovator regulation of the Ministry for National Defense states: "...superiors have the task to prepare, conduct and evaluate the MMM in connection with innovator conferences."² Also: ..."the

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political organs and innovator groups will cooperate in the preparation, execution and evaluation of the MMM."3

The leadership concept for the innovator and MMM movement provides further that in January of the respective training year the directives of the commander of the formation concerning the preparation and execution of the MMM have to be drafted. It serves as the working document for the commanders and military leaders at all levels.

It is necessary for the success of the MMM that all those responsible have to cooperate according to a unified, concrete and budgetable task concept. This means that all subordinates will be acquainted with the commander's unified concept and that an exact training program is evolved and realized with the responsible functionaries of the youth and innovator activity. Much significance has to be ascribed in this connection to the "Days of the Innovators."

This form of consultation with the innovators and rationalizers is used by the commanders and functionaries of the innovator and youth activity in order to inform the innovators concerning further projects and to advise them of experiences useful to their activity. Special attention is paid in this connection to the reporting requirements of the innovators and the task organization of the commander as well as to the turnover of youth construction projects. As already explained, the preparation of the MMM includes a multitude of tasks. These can only be realized through a tight form of organization and leadership. In this connection all participants should keep asking themselves the question: Who benefits from the MMM? What do we want to achieve with the MMM? For whom are we building the MMM? To pay the appropriate attention to these questions is the highest law for the MMM working group of the formation.

The Task of the MMM Working Group

The MMM working group ordered into existence by the commander is composed principally of members of the innovator group of the formation (including the operational office of the innovator movement). In some cases it may be expanded for the execution of specific tasks by one or two officers of other sectors.

In our formation we have been mounting the exhibit titled "Recreation, Art and Joy of Life" since 1969 together with the MMM. It proved useful that the club officer of the formation is also a member of the MMM working group. Likewise it was advantageous that a responsible officer of the unit charged with mounting of the formation fair also belongs to this working group.

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Within the working group the following delineation of responsibilities has worked out well in the previous training years:

- the leader of the work group MMM (a deputy chairman of the innovator unit of the formation);
- the first deputy of the MMM working group, responsible for the organization of the MMM;
- the second deputy of the leader, responsible for headquarters security including fire protection and work protective measures;
- communications officer--responsible for the maintenance of the communication links and of the MMM grounds;
- the senior instructor for youth work--responsible for the agitation and propaganda work, for the care of the technical personnel as well as for the drafting of the address on the occasion of the innovator conference;
- the senior officer for club work---responsible for the exhibit titled "Recreation, Art and Joy of Life."

The members of the innovator movement operations office become responsible for all organizational, technical and financial questions the day the participating units and services arrive at the locality in which the MMM is being staged. The MMM working group is responsible for insuring that the directives of the formation commander concerning the organization, preparation and conduct of the MMM, and insures that the projected organizational form of the MMM are put into practice through the close cooperation of all the participating forces. Specifically this involves:

- The construction of the MMM stands according to schedule and plan has to be supervised and monitored;
- The army members and civilian employees detailed to the mounting of the innovator displays have to be used rationally and effectively;
- All operations involved in the mounting of the MMM have to proceed smoothly;
- The MMM has to be directed and visits by groups of army members and civilian employees have to be coordinated;
- The innovators' conference has to be prepared and its actual conduct supported.

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The MMM working group works mainly on an honorary basis. On the first day that the operational preparation of the MMM commences (arrival of the construction detail and stand supervisors) it is temporarily turned into a full-time detail which ends with the proper turn-over of the MMM terrain to the commander of the responsible troop unit. In conclusion it may be said: The MMM working group detailed by the commander and acting on his orders makes an effective contribution to the organization and preparation of the MMM.

FOOTNOTES

1. R. Renske: "Goal-Oriented and Planned Innovator Activity--A Means for the Raising of Combat Readiness," MILITAERWESEN (Berlin) H 5, 1974, p 115-117.
2. Regulation Concerning the Promotion of the Activity of Innovators and Inventors in the Innovator Movement of the National People's Army (Innovator Regulation) of 20 October 1972 (AMBI Part 1 No 43/72 Section 4 h and d).
3. Ibid., paragraph 3(9).

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DESCRIPTION PROVIDED OF SOVIET ALTITUDE SIMULATOR

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Dec 74 pp 116B-118B

[By Lt Col Dr D. Wirth and Senior Lt B. Kasprzak]

/Text/ The physicians practicing aviation medicine are confronted by tasks which include making prognostic statements about the performance capabilities of flight personnel under defined specific professional flight conditions. Serving this purpose is the special functional diagnosis which investigates the effects of specific flight factors on the performance of bodily functions of the pilot and his capacity to adjust to these burdens.

The investigation of the effects of flight factors on the pilot takes place in two fundamental ways:

1. During the flight, using biologic electronic measuring devices for observing the performance of individual bodily functions;
2. Under laboratory conditions, examining the effects of individual factors.

The last method is the type of experimentation which is more propitious economically and provides the greater medical overview.

The Low Pressure Chamber

Three of the most important flight factors can be simulated in the low pressure chamber: diminished atmospheric pressure; variations in atmospheric pressure; and oxygen deficiency.

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The low pressure chamber is also utilized for training purposes and for demonstrations of the effects of altitude in addition to its use for special clinical research and experiments to assess bodily conditions. It thus serves directly to raise combat efficiency.

Technical Construction and Working Principle

The low pressure chamber is a hermetically sealed chamber made of a cast steel outer covering and a plywood lining, and is provided with viewing windows. With the assistance of a vacuum pump air is sucked out and the atmospheric pressure reduced. Fresh air is supplied through a second pipe system, and this guarantees the maintenance of constancy in the percentage composition of the air in the chamber during the entire period of the experiment. By an appropriate combination of feeding in fresh air and sucking air out, conditions of ascent, constancy of simulated altitude and descent are achieved.

What Was the Goal of the Innovator Work Regarding the Low Pressure Chamber?

Experiments in the low pressure chamber must conform to the fundamental requirements for medical research methodology, that is, they must be:

- adequate for the question to be resolved;
- objectively verifiable (meaning testable);
- precise and repeatable;
- not perilous for either the persons being investigated or for the investigator; and,
- rational and economic.

With these requirements as a basis, sufficient points of attack for innovator work are provided even when the experimentation technique is a very good one. For this reason the innovators of the IFLM /Institute for Aviation Medicine/ concentrated upon:

- improving the safety of the persons in the experiments;
- perfecting the precision of altitude simulation;
- extending the range of possible utilization of the low pressure chamber; and
- improving economic effectiveness.

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Content of Innovator Suggestions

First

A two-way communication facility was built in. This made possible good oral communication between the doctor and the person being tested even if the aircraft radio telephone facility ceased functioning. In addition to this consideration, there are a series of clinical experiments which are better performed if the subject can be tested without wearing helmet headphones and a throat microphone.

Second

To carry out a standing test at a simulated height a special support was built, consisting of a parachute body harness and a support fastener attached to a rail on the ceiling. This support device is certain to prevent the person being tested from injuring himself in the event of a sudden collapse.

Third

A special device was created for drawing off exhaled air separately for the medical personnel participating directly in the testing within the pressure chamber. This draw-off conduit from the oxygen masks of the medical personnel to the vacuum side of the exhaust system prevents an increase in the oxygen content of air within the chamber. Such an increase would falsify the nominal altitude in physiological terms.

Fourth

Supplementary heating coils can be built into the air filter through which fresh air is sucked out of the atmosphere to warm the fresh air. An adjusted warming of the fresh air drawn in guarantees that the temperature within the chamber remains approximately constant even during the winter months. It then is no longer necessary to take fresh air from within the building.

Fifth

The installation of devices leading out of the chamber--optionally for three standard EKG cables, or for other bio-electronic measurement data--for synchronized recording with four persons, raised the medical quality and economic effectiveness of the investigations.

Sixth

The permanent installation of a folding cot in the front wall of the relatively small low pressure chamber makes possible a rapid change in

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function in the use of the chamber for various clinical tests in the course a given simulated altitude.

Seventh

The oxygen instruments and other apparatus can be mounted on the long side of the low pressure chamber by means of sheet aluminum coverings that can be firmly attached with screws to the fastening plates of a support fixture. This rearrangement of the equipment, which can be executed speedily, makes possible the use of the low pressure chamber for active physical training.

Eighth

For the purpose of verifying psychological effects during ascents, a control device was mounted for the rate-of-climb indicator and the altimeter in the interior space of the low pressure chamber that was not attached to the interior space of the low pressure chamber. This makes it possible, in conjunction with the noise of the vacuum pump and the sounds of the flow through the pipe system of the low pressure chamber, to simulate various altitudes. (Illustration 1)

Ninth

For taking blood samples with a pipette at simulated altitudes, the oxygen masks of medical-technical assistants were pierced through at the center of the hole fitted with a closeable transfer pipe. The end of the transfer pipe within the mask serves as a nipple, and a flexible tube connects the pipette to it.

Tenth

Local water supply peculiarities which can lead from time to time to extremely low drops in water pressure, were taken care of by building in a supplemental water circulation facility, to be worked by the vacuum pump. In this way the research program can be fulfilled even when the water supply is extremely bad. What is more, there is, as a consequence, a diminution in the high water requirements.

Eleventh

The individual recording devices in the area of the stationary low pressure chamber were brought together at a central place, a partial synchronized switching together of the recording devices and of the available data supply lines from the various testing stations was created. By this means investment costs were reduced. And by this means the degree of utilization of the instruments is increased, and a comprehensive physiological experiment is possible.

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


Illustration 1. Schematic Diagram of the Apparatus for Plausibly Simulating Altitude

(In the course of a preceding simulated ascent, using the low pressure chamber, but not involving any persons, the air is sucked out of the vacuum reservoir through the open vacuum nipple. During this operation the vacuum control valve is left open and the atmosphere control valve is kept closed. In the course of a plausible simulation of altitude the vacuum nipple is kept closed while the rate-of-climb indicator and the altimeter are regulated by the physician by means of the atmosphere control valve and the vacuum control valve.)

Key:

- | | |
|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| 1. Rate-of-climb indicator | 5. Interior |
| 2. Altimeter | 6. Exterior |
| 3. Vacuum nipple | 7. Atmosphere control valve |
| 4. Low pressure chamber wall | 8. Vacuum control valve |
| | 9. Vacuum reservoir |

Twelfth

The reconstruction of the interior fittings in the low pressure chamber for the simultaneous testing of eight persons in one session was an essential improvement in economic effectiveness. The oxygen instruments and apparatus originally placed on the long side of the chamber were stored in a built-in cross bar. Four portable folding chairs with arm-rests were set up to the right and left of this longitudinal cross bar fixture respectively. The physician exercises visual control through a mirror suspended at an oblique angle from the rear wall.

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OFFICER-SUBORDINATE RELATIONSHIPS EXAMINED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Dec 74 pp 98C-101C

[By Commander P Grundmann, psychologist]

/Text/ Every year newly commissioned lieutenants are assigned on board ship or boats or to shore installations to perform their duty in the People's Navy as superiors in charge of young people. For this purpose they received the requisite theoretical basic knowledge, solid specialized knowledge and the necessary practical skills during their training at our Karl Liebknecht Officers Training School.

A basic requisite for their successful performance as officers is a sharply profiled class point of view, which governs their thought and action. Thorough knowledge of our scientific world view, of Marxism-Leninism, constitutes the basis for successful service in the fleet. The young lieutenants possess sufficient knowledge and, to a degree, also the skills for leading military collectives and for forming socialist soldier personalities. This fundamental and many-sided preparation for service as an officer does not exclude, however, that assignment to the first tour of duty as an officer, whether at sea or ashore, may involve many problems which make it a real test of mettle for the young lieutenant.

Full personal responsibility as commander for the fulfillment of all orders, training and combat tasks, and by virtue of this, responsibility, above all, for the sailors and noncommissioned officers as well as combat materiel placed under his charge poses new and higher challenges to every newly assigned lieutenant than he ever had to face before. To be sure, these new challenges were known to the young lieutenant theoretically,

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but they had not hitherto been practically experienced to their full extent. A real problem exists here for the successful performance of duty, particularly during the first months of an active duty assignment. This is expressed quite clearly over and over again in the conversations of young officers.

This new situation of exclusive personal responsibility for men and materiel requires first of all additional hard work on oneself, in the course of which much good help and support, to be sure, is extended to the young comrades.

Shaping relations with his subordinates occupies a particularly important place amid the demands which the young lieutenant must meet on his first tour of duty as an officer.

The following considerations predominate in explaining why this is so:

Permanently high combat readiness demands from every member of the army an increasing readiness to fulfill the growing political-moral, psychic, and physiological demands of military service with the greatest degree of personal responsibility. This presupposes, however, that the socialist relations between superior and subordinate, which are shaped by the same class interests and goals, are also experienced subjectively in this manner. The superiors bear a great responsibility for this, and by that token, the young lieutenants also.

The relations of the superior to the subordinates essentially determine the effectiveness of measures of educational influence, and therefore are of particular importance in giving form to worldly ideological positions and attitudes. These relations have, therefore, direct influence on shaping the political consciousness of the subordinates.

The creative and initiative-rich fulfillment of all orders and regulations only prevails where the relations of people are healthy and markedly in conformity with the norms of socialist morality. The relations of the young officer to his subordinates play a decisive role in this matter.

The nature of the relations of the superior to the subordinate is also reflected in the relations of the members of the collective with one another. This has a strong influence on the overall atmosphere of the collective and finds expression in a model performance of duty, in conscious military discipline and order, in the accomplishments of socialist competition, in joy in service and in emotional ties to the collective.

The further development of weapons systems and combat materiel poses new and higher demands on the socialist relations of the members of the army.

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Only where good, well-developed relations between superiors and subordinates exist, can the technical parameters of our ships and boats also be fully exploited.

The special importance of sharply profiled socialist relations, finally, is also to be seen in the fact that with the increasing socialist development of our republic, the young people are attaching ever high demands and expectations on relations with their superiors.

The growing importance of socialist relations for permanently high combat readiness is emphasized in the report to the Ninth Delegates Conference of the SED Party Organizations in the NVA /National People's Army/ and in the GDR border troops. It reads: "The young soldiers who have grown up in our socialist environment expect a high level of development in class relations, comradeship and mutual help in the army and among the border troops. They want to be respected and made to feel full trust and confidence."¹

Precisely for the young lieutenant, however, the correct shaping of relations with the subordinate is a difficult task. It is especially difficult because:

A great many conditions exert an influence on these relations; for example: the strength and activity of the party group, the leadership style of the superior, the atmosphere in the combat collective, the level of development of the noncommissioned officers, the work of the FDJ organization, the traditions of the garrison, living and service work conditions, and much else.

Socialist relations only develop in a prolonged process involving much conflict, where the variety of situations prevailing at the beginning and the experience which the collective has had with previous superiors play a very important role.

Along with knowledge of the pedagogical and psychological laws and phenomena at work there must also be available leadership experiences of one's own, but which the young lieutenant, by force of circumstances, still does not have at his disposal to the degree required.

Help and support, advice and suggestions can be given by experienced officers, but the translation of these into practical educational work can only be done by the young lieutenant himself.

Successes, and also failures in the shaping of socialist relations often are not immediately and directly visible. It is therefore also possible, for example, even when deficiencies exist in socialist relations, to still attain good training results for a time.

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The imitation of personally experienced superior-subordinate relations at the officer training school or with the troops does not by any logic of necessity have to be as successful as it was in the case of another superior, because the given situation is entirely different.

Nevertheless, many young lieutenants master this difficult leadership requirement in good order and in a relatively short time. Particular success is to be observed in those instances where the young officers are regularly induced to judge their relations to their subordinates in a self-critical way. The evaluation can either be performed or requested in the course of normal duty by the superiors of the young lieutenant, or by party-like discussions in the collective of the party group or basic organization. Today it has become a necessity for the best young officers to obtain evaluations of these complicated demands of their service, and to judge their accomplishments in this area independently. Generalizing from the good experiences of the young lieutenants, there are a few generally valid practical modes of conduct, which lead to speedy and successful development of socialist relations to subordinates. The following is characteristic in this connection:

These young lieutenants, in their overall performance of duty, feel themselves to be officials of the party, and in every situation give expression by work and deed to their clear class point of view. They see in the unity of word and deed an important factor in the attitude of the subordinate to the superior. They view the acceptance of social functions as aiding in the fulfillment of their tasks as political and military leaders, precisely because in this way skills in getting along with the comrades are strengthened. They not only have understood the unity of political and military leadership theoretically but transpose this purposefully into practical action.

From the very beginning these young lieutenants take their further political education just as seriously as they take their continued professional education. This is particularly important to fulfill the high demands made upon them as political leaders and educators. This also plays a special important role in shaping relations with the subordinates, because it presupposes on the part of the subordinates extensive and precise political knowledge. Deficiencies in this relationship inevitably lead to loss in authority, whereas gaps concerning individual professional problems can at least initially be tolerated more easily by the subordinates.

These young lieutenants succeed in fully exploiting the mobilizing function of the party and FDJ members. They confer regularly both with the members and candidates as well as with the functionaries of the FDJ, and insist particularly on obtaining from them model performance of duty and party-like deportment in the collective. But they also seek their advice and critical comments for their own leadership performance as young officers.

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These young lieutenants have a genuine need to understand closely the problems, joys and worries of their subordinates and to be trusted as the confidants of their comrades. These relations of the young lieutenant to his subordinates have been well developed if the subordinates turn to the young officer with their particular questions. And this, incidentally, even takes place when it is not by any means clear whether he can be of any help to them at all. These officers achieve this by a close and strongly felt contact with the subordinates, by regular and well-targeted personal conversations, through the utilization of the various possibilities afforded by working together during and after duty hours, and by personal participation in the work of culture and sport.

Many a young lieutenant believes that this close and exact familiarization with their subordinates happens of its own accord, as a result of living together, particularly on board ship. The importance of this task is also frequently underestimated because they have a lesser number of subordinates than a platoon leader in a motorized infantry unit.

These are wrong ideas, which can rapidly have negative effects upon superior-subordinate relations. The smaller the collective and the more closely life is lived together, the greater is the importance of the so-called "little things" in shaping socialist relations. The young lieutenant is always at the focal point of the attention of his subordinates. For him there is hardly a personality area whose privacy remains hidden from his subordinates.

These young lieutenants are able to make clear after a short time in the most varied ways to each of the subordinates their places in the collective. They understand how to use the wisdom of the collective for the fulfillment of political and military tasks, by provoking and seizing upon the suggestions, thoughts and ideas of the subordinates. They do not regard the subordinates as objects of education, but involve them in the educational process. The preparation and allocation of personal and collective obligations in socialist competition afford particularly favorable opportunities for this. Thus, for example, it is correct to rely upon the most active and best members of the collective, but at the same time the efforts and readiness to perform of all the other comrades should not be underestimated. Particularly in the case of less active subordinates, disregard for even the smallest progress in their efforts often has specially negative effects on the relations of the comrades with one another and with the superior.

These young lieutenants know how to utilize the noncommissioned officers-- in the majority it is a matter of young noncommissioned officers--as co-educators. They delegate soluble tasks to them and equip them thereby for the ever better fulfillment of their functions. As young lieutenants

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they are also ready to accept good experiences and many a "practical wrinkle" especially from the older noncommissioned officers.

They do themselves and their noncommissioned officers a disservice if they take over the duties of the latter. Many a young lieutenant believes he is saving time by doing this, or is protecting himself from deficiencies in the performance and fulfillment of the task. That is a mistake. The greater expenditure of time in the beginning, and also the higher risk that this or that task will not be accomplished in quite the prescribed manner, are more than outweighed very rapidly by the educational success achieved with these noncommissioned officers in the process.

These young lieutenants succeed by tightly organized training, maintained at a high level, in propagating joy and optimism as a dominant trait in the collective. They use praise far more than reproach, esteem good accomplishments directly, and generalize positive experiences. They talk about deficiencies openly before the collective, and obtain the participation of all comrades in overcoming these. The principle governing the shaping of their relations with the subordinates is the imposition of high demands on each subordinate while taking his personality into full consideration. In this way success is also achieved in making sailors and noncommissioned officers more clearly conscious of their responsibility for the entire collective.

The young lieutenants always have an open ear for the suggestions and advice of other officers. They accept good experiences willingly. In the case of difficulties they turn with complete trust to their superiors or seek advice in the party collective. Mistakes and reversals in their own work with the subordinates are the occasion for them to take a self-critical position. They not only evaluate the state of socialist relations achieved with respect to and within their collective, but they also analyze the cause of success and the obstacles to it. They are impatient with shortcomings and abuses.

These are several of the generally valid practical modes of behavior of successful young lieutenants, which have great importance for the correct relationship with subordinates. Deliberately taking these into consideration at the time of entering upon the first tour of duty as an officer is highly to be recommended because it is especially during the first months of service as an officer that certain educational habits take shape which exercise a considerable influence on the entire educational behavior of the officer in the future. In this way the young lieutenant will do justice in good measure to the requirement of the Ninth Delegates Conference which reads:

"It is to an important degree a matter of preparing the foundation on which true socialist relations grow by purposeful individual political

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work, by a level of full intellectual-cultural life in the units, by a continuous heightening of requirements and a greater degree of organization of military everyday life in the barracks and aboard ship."²

FOOTNOTES

1. W. Verner: "Fuer hohe Kampfkraft und Gefechtsbereitschaft." In: PARTEIARBEITER (Berlin), special edition for the Ninth Conference of Delegates, No 1, 1974, p 44.
2. Ibid.

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PROCESSES INVOLVED IN SUPPLYING SHIPS OUTLINED

East Berlin MILITAERWESEN in German Dec 74 pp 107C-11C

[By Commander H. Teichmann]

/Text/ An essential factor and an important element for guaranteeing high combat and deployment readiness of the units is permanent material support to supply all the goods required. As a consequence of the continuing perfection and modernization of technical methods, the range and complexity of the material means is growing all the time, and material support is becoming ever more important. It is consequently necessary that all men and women comrades engaged in the supply sector bring to bear all their strength, their wealth of ideas and their organizing ability so that speedy supply of the units is ensured in a suitable manner.

Nautical-Technical Equipment Supply

All supplies have to be planned, managed and inventoried on the basis of legal definitions and military regulations in support of permanent combat readiness and fulfillment of training tasks.

Nautical-technical supplies are used to equip:

--ships and boats;

--workshops of the inland bases and slip facilities;

--training facilities;

--offices and facilities of the People's Navy for the maintenance and support of the operations of the technical facilities (per official terminology).

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The supplies of the nautical-technical supply sector are included in a catalog of items and given code numbers in accordance with the Central Catalog of Items (ZAK). In this way the basis was provided for mechanized record-keeping and for the comprehensive utilization of ADP for determining needs, inventorying stock, and planning.

Planning

Perspective and annual plans were set up for supplying ships, boats, and other vessels having authorized requirements, with nautical-technical supplies. The requisite balancing off of material stocks and the placement of orders is done on the basis of these plans. The quality and realism of the plans and of the submitted contributions to the plans constitute forthwith an important basis for ensuring supply.

The perspective and annual plans consist of: the material and equipment plan (MAP), the normal trade import plan, and the special import plan.

The bases for planning are:

- authorized structural and table-of-organization plans, and inventories of equipment, inventory lists, and plans for fitting up workshops;
- the supply and equipment condition of ships and boats;
- remaining planned service life of ships and boats;
- warehousing and consumption norms;
- average actual consumption of spare parts per annum;
- stocks on hand;
- requirements for filling gaps and rounding off supplies.

Materials Requisitioning and Delivery to Supply Areas

The supply areas request their entire material requirements quarterly from the appropriate department. The request is made on the receiving and issuance document (EAB), made out in four copies, and by entry in the consumption materials limit book of the supply area, on the dates set for the separate quarters.

After processing the requests submitted by the given department, they are turned over to the central warehouse for assembling the materials and preparing delivery.

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After that, a delegate of the supply sector takes charge of the materials. This person carries out spot checks to determine whether quantity and quality match the entries on the EAB and in the consumption materials limit book. He clarifies technically imprecise specifications in the requests, and stipulates, when this is possible, substitute materials for items not currently available. In addition, he supervises and checks the packing and shipping arrangements to make sure they are in order and safe for transport. The person taking charge of the shipment seals the transport containers and receives the documents (passes, tests, EAB, documents for leased goods and so on). Following this the materials are shipped in accordance with the data supplied by the person in charge of the materials concerning the mode of shipment and the destination.

The supplies are to be checked in the supply area for completeness of count and measure, and are then to be accepted. Subsequent claims, which arise during acceptance must be filed with the central warehouse within a month's time. In filing, there is to be supplied the number of the EAB, the date of taking title, the mode of shipment, and the claim (amount, quality, extent of damage, and so on). Materials required to eliminate functional troubles aboard ships and boats, and which are not available at the time in the warehouse of the supply area, must be requested with a technical notification (TM) filed with the duty officer of the rear services in conformity with stipulations laid down in the service regulations. These materials are delivered by courier to the supply area, because of urgency, after identification of the unit for which they are intended, and specification of the TM number.

The large pieces of equipment and special materials included in the annual plan by the supply areas are consolidated in the delivery plan, and following their arrival at the central warehouse are delivered on a continuing basis to the supply areas.

Industry delivers the following supplies directly to the larger supply areas: metallurgical products, paint, fenders, cleaning rags, and anchor chains (SHD /Maritime Hydrographic Service/).

The conclusion of industrial contracts takes place on the basis of the annual planning of the supply areas or of valid consumption norms.

Deliveries Within the Supply Areas

Business hours for the issuance of materials have been set for the nautical-technical warehouses of the supply areas.

All deliveries must be authenticated on the EAB by the personnel designated for this purpose.

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The delivery of consumable supplies takes place on the basis of requirements posted by the user in the limit book. The consumer is only to request the actually needed amount (up to the limit of the authorized consumable supply norm), after taking available stocks into consideration. The consumer is not obligated to remove the total amount of the consumable supply limit. Compulsory deliveries by the warehouse to the consumer are not permitted.

Materials for the elimination of functional disturbances (per the technical notification) are to be issued daily during business hours on the basis of EAB's. Issuance at any time during the day or night occurs for the elimination of functional disturbances at Urgency Level I and on the occasion of EKZ /wartime conditions?/ IV and V. If the requested materials are not available, then they must be delivered as soon as they are brought by a courier. But in this case also the specially carried materials must be recorded pursuant to regulations.

Tools and other objects of equipment are to be exchanged during the fixed business hours of the warehouse. Issuance takes place on the basis of an EAB and, as a matter of basic principle, only in exchange for the return of the old unusable parts or against submission of a damage and loss report processed in conformity with regulations. Materials which are worth repairing will be sent for repair. All other materials will be scrapped.

Return of Materials to Stock

Supply areas which possess materials which are no longer needed report these on EAB's (made out in four copies) at the prescribed times to the appropriate department. This department unit will check to see if demand exists in other supply areas for the released materials. If so, then transfer to the appropriate supply area takes place. If there is no demand, then the department earmarks the materials for return to the central warehouse.

Materials which are returned to stock must possess their full utility value, be in a clean condition, and plainly marked and characterized (for example, with the replacement part number).

Dealing With Materials for Repair

To guarantee the economical use of materials means and to ensure material supply, the following materials are especially to be included for reconditioning:

--items which are subject to rapid wear and tear, and which break down into a great number of pieces;

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- items whose procurement new involves high financial expenditures;
- items for which the coverage of demand is not fully guaranteed;
- items which involve heavy expenditures of materials or labor when produced new.

To implement the exchange procedure and to take control of all replacement parts worth reconditioning, divisional and battalion units must as a matter of fundamental principle only issue new replacement parts against the surrender of the old parts, pursuant to the principle of "new for old."

To take control of all construction parts, aggregates, motors and so on which are capable of being repaired, collection points have been set up for this purpose in all supply areas that monthly, usually during the last week, deliver the repair parts taken in to the central collection points. Two central collection points have been set up for the nautical-technical supply sector.

At the first collection point all large parts, such as complete motors, drives, condensers, exhaust gas turbosuperchargers are accepted from the supply areas, and assembled for conveyance to the repair plants. At the second collection point all smaller aggregates and attaching parts are gathered up, such as, for example, turbine pumps, refrigerating condensers, injection pumps, generators and the like.

In turning over the repair parts to the central collection points absolute care must be taken that the parts are complete, clean, and accurately marked. If the parts delivered do not conform to the named requirements, they will not be accepted by the central collection points.

After they are repaired these parts will be conveyed to the central warehouse and included in the general supply.

Working With Norms

Work is performed according to the following norms in the nautical-technical supply sector:

- the consumable supplies norm for the consumer (ships and boats);
- the consumable supplies limit for the supply areas;
- warehouse norms (minimum norm and maximum norm) for the central warehouse and for the warehouses of the supply areas.

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Several fundamental remarks should be made concerning the consumption norms.

The consumption norm is the theoretically forecasted value for the anticipated consumption during a particular unit of time. Since consumption is dependent upon many factors, such as the thorough execution of maintenance work, the level of training of the crews, the conditions of utilization and the length of time the units are deployed, there can never be complete compatibility between the consumption norm and actual consumption. In addition there are also several factors of a contingent nature. For the reasons mentioned it is necessary to work continuously with the norms, that means analyzing the average numerical values of a number of years, annual specificity of the norm, evaluation of the conditions of deployment of the units, giving consideration to the introduction of materials of improved quality and increased durability, and so on.

The consumable supplies norm for the consumer stipulates which consumption materials can be received by the consumer in the course of a year. This norm is entered in the consumable materials book of the unit, and in conformity with this, requisitions can be filled quarterly until the annual norm is reached. If a need exists over and above the annual norm, then this must be supported by reasons and requested separately.

As a matter of basic principle, only that amount should be requisitioned which is actually needed. For this reason the consumers are also not obligated to receive from the warehouse of the supply area the entire amount set by the annual norm. Norm change proposals are to be submitted annually up to 30 June to the appropriate department.

The consumable materials limit of the supply areas is established from year to year on the basis of the units to be supplied by the supply area as reflected by ADP. The supply areas receive annually, up to 30 November, from the given department the lists assembled by ADP for the prescribed limit. The amounts are posted in the consumable materials limit book. In conformity with the prescribed limits, the supply areas requisition their needs quarter by quarter. The aggregate amount may not exceed the limit for the year. Supplemental requisitions are to be submitted separately to the appropriate department.

The warehouse norms set the level of the lowest and highest inventory of the materials to be stored in the central warehouse and in the warehouses of the supply areas. The minimum and maximum norms are to be entered on the inventory card and the warehouse stock cards.

These positions are to be taken into consideration by the supply areas for the quarterly requisition, and at the latest when the minimum norm is reached. The minimum norm does not signify that no more deliveries

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are to be made to meet demand (deliveries to meet demand continue to the zero point). It is an indicator value which is supposed to show that replenishment must be undertaken.

The maximum norm is a handicap value which is derived from the anticipated demand, the supply position for a definite period of time (1 to 2 years, depending on the warehouse level and position), and the available warehouse capacity. It is also at the same time an important index number for planning.

Proposals for changes in warehouse norms, which can be either a question of the level of the norm or also a question of assortment, are to be submitted annually to the appropriate department up to 30 June.

To ensure a permanent supply adjusted to demand, work with norms should not be performed sporadically in a routine sort of way, but it must be made a part of the management and leadership activity of the supply organs at all levels.

Warehouse Economy in the Nautical-Technical Supply Sector

Inventory Management

A precise and effort-free management of inventory is the basis for order, businesslike dealing and supply in the area of material support. The management of inventory must guarantee that supply goods are completely recorded statistically, and that a permanent control over changes in inventory level is possible. It constitutes an important basis for the planning of all material financial means, and is intended for management, control, and the analysis of the working of the economy in the area of supply. All movement of supply goods, no matter whence they come or where they are going, must be documented. The record must be truthful, comprehensible at a glance, and always available for test-checking.

Bookkeeping documents (EAB, delivery slips) must be available for all inflow and issuance of goods. Entries on inventory documents (inventory card, stockbook, and so on) may only be made on the basis of bookkeeping documents. Unusable or rejected materials may only be deducted from the inventory records when a certified verbal record of the removal decision is available as a basis.

Basic Principles of Warehousing

All materials are to be stored in a manner suitable to their character (sensitivity to moisture, vulnerability to corrosion, perishableness and so on) so that a basis is provided for maintaining their worth and functional usefulness. In addition to that, care is to be taken that no losses may arise because of theft.

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The storage of all supply goods takes place on the basis of a certified documented bookkeeping plan of the warehouse. The foundation is thereby created for the effective utilization of warehouse capacity and guaranteeing security in the warehouse. Furthermore, it is also achieved thereby that storage of the materials is easily visible and comprehensible, that assortments are correctly grouped, and the location of items easily ascertained.

Storage takes place in:

- containers of various sizes for visible storage;
- staple frames;
- box pallets;
- grilled box pallets;
- flat pallets;
- shelving of all sorts.

In the central warehouse the shelf-servicing instruments have proved their worth. Effective full utilization of the warehouse area was made possible by this, because the overall height of the warehouse hall could be used. Furthermore, with the introduction of this technique an important reduction in the burdensomeness of work was achieved, and labor productivity for deliveries was increased.

In storing newly received goods care has to be taken that these materials are so stocked in the visible containers, pallets, and so on, that those supplies which have been on hand for a longer time now, are issued first.

Organization in the Warehouse

In warehouse areas transfer surfaces are marked for goods moving into or out of the warehouse. All supplies which are coming in or are being prepared for issuance are deposited on these surfaces. Merchandise coming in is checked by the warehouse personnel assigned to this for full count, quality, damage in transport, matching of contract numbers, presence of documentation and delivery bills. Only after this is accomplished does the taking in and storage in appropriate warehouse receptacles take place.

Materials such as screws, nuts, tools, standard parts and so on, which are delivered loose in great numbers of pieces, are sealed in foil as

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packaged units by spot welding to improve storage, prevent corrosion and to make issuance easier. Furthermore, this makes the taking of inventory easier.

For unpacking and spotweld sealing of materials in foil, transportable devices were created by the personnel of the central warehouse, using an innovator suggestion as a basis, and these make it possible to perform this work right at the storage point. The spotweld sealing in foil is also used for a great number of supplies that are being delivered to the supply areas. The quality of the delivery is thereby improved, for the materials are protected against the effects of the weather, transport losses are reduced, and the taking in and storage in the supply area is made easier.

It was decided, for the sake of ensuring a regular, planned flow of work in the central warehouse, that it would be a rule that deliveries on requisitions from the units which fell outside the regular plan, and deliveries to industry (shipyards and repair enterprises), would only be made on Thursdays of each week. All deliveries by the central warehouse take place only on instructions (EAB or telegraph message) from the professional service unit. Incoming shipments packed in loan property will be received as speedily as possible to make good the return of the loan property within the time period agreed. The loan property is to be cleansed of paper, cardboard, excelsior and other packing contents, and put immediately into an orderly condition ready for shipment. Concrete records will be kept of the arrival and departure of the loan property.

Order in the Warehouse

The chief of the warehouse area is responsible for the cleanliness, security and order in the warehouse. Order and security must always be in conformity with the valid regulations for labor protection and fire prevention. For the rest, the same requirements for order and security exist in the nautical-technical warehouses as are established in the regulations for all warehouses of the NVA.

This exposition shall serve as information concerning the organization of nautical-technical supply in the People's Navy and the warehouse economy in this area. In addition to this, it is intended to provide a stimulus to other professional areas for further cooperation, and contribute to the improvement of the overall supply of our units with supplies needed for material support.

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